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FAILING AT COLLEGE FOOTBALL REFORM:  
THE JAN KEMP TRIAL AT THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 
by 
Michael J. Fulford 
 
 Throughout the history of college football, there have been efforts to reform the 
system and stop improprieties, yet conflict between gaining academic and athletic 
prowess at colleges remained a central theme.  In the 1980s, the Jan Kemp trial involving 
the University of Georgia demonstrated this clash between revenue-generating athletics 
and academic integrity.  This historical study is an in-depth analysis of archives, legal 
documents, interviews, and other textual evidence that demonstrated how the factors 
surrounding the Jan Kemp case evolved and how key administrators and faculty members 
reacted to pressure related to academic and athletic conflicts.  An analysis of past reform 
efforts in college football identified presidential control, commercialization of athletics, 
and corruption of the student-athlete ideal through preferential treatment as the key issues 
universities must address in relation to their football programs.  An analysis of the 
University of Georgia in relation to these issues showed that pressure to increase revenue 
from football led to a lack of presidential control over academic-athletic conflicts and 
allowed preferential treatment of athletes to persist at the expense of academic integrity.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
From the beginning, fans and boosters have driven college football and to a point 
where it exudes a tremendous level of power on college campuses today.  The 80,000 
screaming fans in a stadium watching 22 young men playing football exemplifies the 
popularity of this sport.  The combination of spectators and money has created a powerful 
enterprise.  In his book, Rammer Jammer Yellow Hammer, Warren St. John described 
the love for college football in Alabama like this, “To understand what absolute minority 
non-fans are in Alabama, consider this: they are outnumbered there by atheists.”1   
Football is arguably the most popular and most influential sport in the United 
States of America (US).  In Lawrenceville, GA, about 40 miles from the University of 
Georgia (UGA), the Board of Regents (BoR) opened a new college, Georgia Gwinnett 
College.  In his proposal to the county commissioners concerning plans for the future of 
the college, President Daniel Kaufman quipped, “the parking lot of a nearby Wal-Mart 
Supercenter would be the perfect location for a football field.”2  Kaufman’s statement 
may be more a prophecy than a joke.  Since the first intercollegiate football game 
between Princeton and Rutgers in 1869, football has become a major component of the 
perception and culture of college.  Football has been used as a public relations tool to 
                                                 
1Warren St. John,  Rammer Jammer Yellow Hammer (New York: Crown, 2004), pp.1-2.  A poll done by 
 the Mobile Register showed 90% of the state’s citizens described  themselves as college football 
 fans.   
2
 Young, Camie, “College Planning Future of Campus” Gwinnett Daily Post. Sunday February 11, 2007, 
 sec. A, p. 10. 
1 
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increase exposure for colleges and increase revenue in the form of tuition, donations, 
tickets, and licensing.  However, few football programs bring in millions of dollars and 
there are many others that lose money.  The National Collegiate Athletic Association  
(NCAA) recognizes different levels of competition, called divisions.  The majority of 
revenue-producing sports are in what the NCAA calls Division I-A, and within this 
division, the largest revenue-producing schools play football.  In the NCAA’s 2004-2006 
study of revenues and expenses at Division I-A institutions, 19 out of the 119 institutions 
that make up the Football Bowl Subdivision had a positive net revenue during that time 
period.   
The average net generated revenues for those surplus programs in 
2006 was $4,291,000, while the average net deficit for the remaining 
(deficit) programs was $8,923,000. The gap between the financially 
successful programs ($13,214,000 in 2006) and others continues to 
broaden and has almost doubled since 2004.3 
The study showed that football does bring in a lot of money, but in the end, the 
majority of the institutions participating in intercollegiate athletics are running on a 
deficit and need additional revenue from the university to at least break-even.  For those 
colleges where football does produce revenue, the effect and influence it has on the 
institution is even stronger.  At many colleges and universities with revenue-producing 
football programs, the athletic department reports directly to the president.  Athletic 
directors and football coaches have complex contracts that include television revenue and 
exemption clauses.  Provosts and vice-presidents are rarely compensated at the same 
level or receive a similar level of attention from the institution’s chief executive.  On 
Saturdays in the fall, stadiums are filled with students, faculty members, staff members, 
                                                 
3
 Daniel Fulks.  NCAA 2004-2006 Revenues and Expenses of Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs  
Report. (Indianapolis, IN:NCAA, March 2008).  p. 13. 
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alumni and alumnae, and other fans cheering and showing school spirit.  Outside the 
stadium, there is trash from tailgating, broken bottles, vomit, vandalism, and other forms 
of activities that might create student, faculty, staff, alumni and alumnae, and community 
outrage were it not a football game day.  I know this because I have been a participant in 
the culture as a student, a fan, and an alumnus of the University of Georgia.  Having lived 
the life as a fanatic, attending football games, screaming at opposing players, and holding 
football up on a pedestal in relation to my life, I decided I needed to understand this 
perspective I share with others and my perspective as a researcher in higher education to 
see where there is congruence or contrast.  Part of what I learned is the undesirable 
effects of football reach beyond the stadium and into the classroom.  Football provides a 
critical juncture where the commercialization and promotion of intercollegiate athletics 
conflicts with the academic integrity of an institution.   
Preferential treatment of athletes and academic abuses are not uncommon at 
universities with college football.  The revenue and exposure that athletics brings to a 
university creates situations where superstar high school athletes who do not meet the 
general standards for admission to an institution are given special treatment.  Wealthy 
boosters pay exceptional athletes cash, cars, and other gifts as incentives for coming and 
staying at their university.4  Examples of preferential treatment can be found regularly 
and are a continuous topic in the news.  Athletes failing a class have grades changed 
while other athletes are guided by coaches to take easier classes in order to retain athletic 
eligibility.  The legitimacy of a college athlete’s academic classes may be questioned due 
to incidents like those that happened at the University of Georgia as recently as 2002.  In 
                                                 
4
 Murray Sperber, College Sports Inc.: The Athletic Depatment versus the University (New York: Henry  
Holt and Company, 1990). 
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the particular incident, the University of Georgia college basketball program was 
suspended and coaches were fired when it was found that athletes were taking a class on 
basketball.5  Some of the tests included questions such as, how many goals are on a 
basketball court?6   
Despite new scandals, commercialization of college football continues and the 
sport still thrives.  Programs that face the NCAA’s so-called death penalty are able to 
survive abolition and rebuild after time.7  With each new scandal, the NCAA and other 
administrators tinker and tweak the system.  However, athletic programs and universities 
adapt to the changes and find other ways to gain a competitive edge.  Corruption 
continues, athletes receive special treatment, and the money surrounding college football 
increases for the few most successful football programs.  Richard Ensberger, a writer and 
editor at Newsweek magazine, summarizes the conflict between athletics and academics 
that arises due to the enormous amount of money generated from college football at 
southern schools like the University of Georgia:   
While some university administrators are in thrall to the football program, others 
have fought mostly losing battles to reign in overzealous boosters or coaches 
who’ve cut ethical corners to keep the football team on the fast track.8 
 
The breadth and depth of corruption in intercollegiate athletics in relation to academic 
integrity has grown since the inception of the game.  Throughout the history of college 
football, there have been efforts to reform the system and stop improprieties, yet the 
                                                 
5
 Deepika Rao, “University Report Confirms Allegations, “ The Red and Black, 3 March 2004.   
6
 J. Llewellyn, "Whose Ethics? Whose Leadership?," The Power of Management Capital  (2003). 
7
 John Sayle Watterson, College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
 University, 2000), p. 374. 
8
 Richard Ernsberger, Jr., Bragging rights: a season in the SEC, (New York: M. Evans & Company, Inc.),  
 p. 10. 
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conflict Ernsberger describes between gaining academic and athletic prowess at a college 
remains a central theme.9 
The Jan Kemp trial at the University of Georgia uncovered academic abuses and 
unethical behavior that continued for years to keep key athletes eligible to play football 
for the university.  Jan Kemp was a Developmental Studies professor at the University of 
Georgia who spoke out against academic abuses and preferential treatment toward 
athletes in the Developmental Studies program.  Many of the students involved were 
members of the football team.   
  On February 3, 1982, Jan Kemp was demoted from her position as Coordinator 
of the English component in the Developmental Studies program.  Subsequently, her 
contract was non-renewed.  Following the non-renewal of her faculty contract, she filed a 
lawsuit against the Director of Developmental Studies, Leroy Ervin, and the Vice-
President for Academic Affairs, Virginia Trotter.  Kemp claimed that her demotion and 
dismissal were a result of her speaking out against preferential treatment of athletes.10  
Whether or not her actions were the real reason for her dismissal became an afterthought 
during and after the trial.  The role of college football at the University of Georgia and its 
influence on the decisions of administrators and faculty members became the focus of the 
trial and in the public media.  The Jan Kemp trial at the University of Georgia 
demonstrates the clash between revenue-generating athletics11 and academic integrity.  In 
                                                 
9
 John Sayle Watterson, College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
 University, 2000), p. 374. 
10
 Kemp, J., Interview by author, tape recording, November 22, 2006. 
11
 For the purposes of this study, revenue-generating athletics are considered sports that generate a 
 significant amount of money for the institution and specifically the athletic programs of the 
 university. 
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addition, it provides insight into why a university activity in conflict with academic goals 
is able to persist with essentially the same values and traditions that create conflict.   
Research Questions 
The Jan Kemp trial was not a sudden phenomenon; the events involving Jan Kemp 
occurred over a span of nearly ten years. In addition, there are other factors that set the 
stage for this case before Jan Kemp arrived at the University of Georgia and there are 
suggestions that the University of Georgia continues to see the impact of this case in the 
present.  Scandals and controversy have been a part of college football throughout its 
history.  When these episodes in college football history occurred, the administrators 
involved at the universities found themselves at different points on the continuum 
between supporting academic integrity and supporting athletic prowess.  Academic 
integrity supporters insisted that football was secondary to the academic mission and that 
academic standards should never be lowered for the sake of maintaining a competitive 
advantage in football.12  In opposition to this camp, the athletic prowess camp focused on 
the financial revenue, athletic prestige, and popularity that college football brought to the 
university.  These camps created the external and internal pressure that affected the 
decisions made by administrators, faculty members, and students when they addressed 
academic integrity issues involving athletics.  Additionally, many of the people involved 
found themselves caught in the crossfire of competing interests.  Each time a new effort 
to reform college football emerged, leaders of the effort were forced to address these two 
camps.  According to John Thelin, the major reform efforts in the history of college 
football, beginning with the Carnegie Report of 1929, identified similar issues and similar 
                                                 
12
 John Sayle Watterson, College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
     University, 2000), p. 374. 
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solutions.  These themes are presidential control, commercialization of athletics, and 
corruption of the student-athlete ideal through preferential treatment.13  Presidential 
control concerned the level of involvement the president of the institution had in 
addressing decisions made about athletics.  Commercialization of athletics involves 
making decisions concerning the football program based on economic rewards and 
through increasing revenue regardless of the impact on students or academic integrity.  
Preferential treatment of athletes involves creating separate standards or offering 
additional help to athletes in the form of lowered admission standards, changing grades, 
and allowing extra time to complete assignments.14  Throughout this study, the following 
research questions guided the analysis of historical data. 
1. How did these themes play a role in the Jan Kemp trial and the relationship 
between academic integrity and athletics? 
2. What internal and external factors created an environment for this scandal and 
how did it affect the decision making of key administrators? 
Research Design 
 This is an historical study that utilized data collected from primary and secondary 
sources of textual evidence and interviews.  Primary sources included documents located 
in the archives at the University of Georgia; files provided by J. Hue Henry, attorney for 
Jan Kemp; and Jan Kemp’s personal files.  Additional primary data were collected 
through interviews with specific individuals that provided a unique internal perspective to 
the phenomenon.  The data were then analyzed for themes, patterns, and relationships 
                                                 
13
 John Thelin, Games colleges play, Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996, p. 197. 
14
 John Thelin, Games colleges play, Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996. 
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that provide an interpretation of the relationship between college football and academic 
integrity at the University of Georgia. 
 James Key provides a definition of the historical method of research in education.  
He states that researchers using the historical method “are interested in reporting events 
and/or conditions that occurred in the past.  An attempt is made to establish facts in order 
to arrive at conclusions concerning past events or predict future events.”15  One form of 
historical research design consists of identifying and defining a problem to be studied, 
collecting evidence through primary and secondary sources, analyzing and evaluating the 
data, formulating a hypothesis, and reporting the analysis of these findings.  Key suggests 
that evidence used for historical research needs to be criticized externally.  External 
criticism consists of authenticating the evidence for legitimacy.  If the evidence is 
considered legitimate, then the next step is to evaluate the accuracy of the data.   
John and Jean Comaroff suggest that “texts must be understood within contexts 
and equations of power and meaning must be assigned value.”16  This study involves a 
court trial where individuals spoke on behalf of the plaintiff or defendant.  According to 
Comaroff, the data collected from the trial must be placed within the proper context of 
when and where the statements were made as well as the actual meaning of the 
statements.  Last, the decisions made by administrators at the university must also be 
analyzed from the perspective of political history.  In particular, this study dealt with 
what Peter Clarke described as “manipulation by elites.”17  This view of political history 
                                                 
15
 Key, James, (1997) Research Design in Occupational Education. Oklahoma State University.  
 www.okstate.edu/agedcm4h/aged5980a/5980/newpage19.htm. 
 
16
 Comaroff, J. L., and J. Comaroff. Ethnography and the Historical Imagination: Westview Press, 1992. 
 
17
 Peter Clarke, "Ideas and Interests," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 12, no. 1 (1981).p. 47. 
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focuses on how individual actors or groups gain and maintain power.  Additionally, these 
groups or individuals manipulate the system to preserve their agenda.  The study utilized 
a combination of primary and secondary sources.  Evidence of this type allowed the 
researcher to analyze the situation from multiple contexts that presented data situated at a 
local level and provided evidence that addressed the larger context surrounding the 
situation.   
 The University of Georgia archives have a number of collections related to the 
Jan Kemp trial and other important files concerning key executives and committees.  The 
archives provided a blend of primary and secondary sources that were used to create a 
context for the Jan Kemp case.  Primary sources of information included agendas, 
memoranda, and letters from the files of administrators at the University.  In addition, the 
archives provided secondary sources such as newspaper clippings and faculty newsletters.   
 Jan Kemp provided documents from her personal files including an unpublished 
autobiography.  In addition, Kemp agreed to sit for an interview to discuss her 
experiences.  J. Hue Henry, who served as Jan Kemp’s attorney and a key litigator in the 
trial, granted the researcher full access to all files involved in the Jan Kemp trial.  
Included in these files were court transcripts, depositions, personal notes used during the 
trial, notebooks that outline the evidence used in the trial, policy manuals from the 
University of Georgia, a tape recording of a faculty meeting used as evidence, magazine 
articles, and newspaper publications highlighting the trial.  In addition, Henry agreed to 
sit for an interview to discuss his experience with the Jan Kemp trial.   
 Secondary sources from scholarly works, NCAA reports, and other media sources 
provided data that addressed the larger context surrounding the Jan Kemp case.  An 
10 
 
analysis of these sources demonstrated that the evolution of the sport itself and the off-
the-field academic scandals and controversy were woven throughout the history of 
college football.  The history of college football on and off the field forms the context in 
which the issues from the Jan Kemp trial emerged at the University of Georgia.   
The Intent of This Study 
Although there are relentless, but fruitless efforts to reform college football, it appears 
that at the University of Georgia, the greatest impetus to athletic reform came as a result 
of the Jan Kemp trial. 
John Thelin provides a thorough account of the off-the-field history of college 
football that consisted of scandals and reform efforts that occurred as a result of a 
continuous power play between revenue generating sports and academic integrity. Thelin 
argues this point in the preface of his book, Games Colleges Play. 
All too often significant reform effort has been illusory at worst and transient at 
 best, inflated by a foundation’s good intentions to seize the moment and to appear 
 to be making consequential progress.  Meanwhile, chronic abuses persist.  Most 
 troubling is that any attempt to instill strong academic standards and educational 
 values into highly commercialized sports teams runs the risk of antagonizing 
 those who like the established programs. 18 
 
This study provides an in-depth look at the evolution of a controversial scandal 
involving the intersection of revenue producing intercollegiate athletics and the academic 
integrity of an institution, taking themes provided by past literature and studies of college 
football reform and applying them to the themes that emerged at the University of 
Georgia as a result of the Jan Kemp trial.   
The Kemp trial uncovered academic abuses and preferential treatment of athletes 
and students who were the children of certain politicians.  During the trial, administrators 
                                                 
18
 J. R. Thelin, "Games Colleges Play. Scandal and Reform in Intercollegiate Athletics,"  (1996). 
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and the president of the University of Georgia defended their decisions to admit students 
who were illiterate, but could play football.  By taking a closer look at how the Kemp 
trial unfolded, there is an opportunity to gain a more detailed understanding of how the 
power and influence of college football affected the choices and decision making of 
academic administrators and faculty members at the University of Georgia. 
12 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study looks closely at how the power and influence of college football 
affected the decision making of administrators and faculty at the University of Georgia in 
relation to the Jan Kemp affair.  The literature review establishes the context surrounding 
and building up to the events that impacted the Jan Kemp trial.  First, the early history of 
college football is discussed, with emphasis placed on early events that established the 
influential role of college football.  Second, early reform efforts in college football are 
discussed, including its near abolition in 1905 and the first major study of college 
athletics in the Carnegie Report of 1929.  The third section begins with the 1940s and 
leads into the growth of college football financially and in popularity during the years 
following World War II.  Finally, a brief history of college football at the University of 
Georgia is discussed to provide a local context within the larger national history of 
college football. 
In 1869, Princeton University and Rutgers University engaged in what is 
considered the first intercollegiate football game in the United States.  The game they 
played that day more resembled the game of soccer than the version of football played 
today, but it is recognized by historians as the starting point for college football.  The 
soccer version of the game soon evolved into a game that resembled rugby.  In 1873, 
Yale, Princeton, Rutgers, and Columbia Universities held a meeting to establish formal
12 
13 
 
rules for college football.  At this time, football was primarily run by students and alumni 
who stayed involved after graduation.   
Beginning in 1880, football began to evolve into the version played today.  
According to football historians, the transformation of football is due primarily to the 
innovations of Walter Camp.  Camp is known as the “Father of American Football.”  
During his time as a student at Yale he began to push for changes to the game and when 
he graduated, he became even more influential in changing the rules.  Camp regularly 
attended the athletic association meetings and helped to coach the Yale team.  Camp was 
well respected and even traveled to California to coach the Stanford University team.  At 
this time, there were no rules governing athletic eligibility so alumni and even faculty 
members were often members of the football team.  In 1878, Camp proposed changing 
many of the old rules of the game.  His proposals were rejected for a couple of years, but 
he continued to propose the changes.  In 1880, the rules convention for college football 
agreed to lower the number of players for one team on the field from 15 to 11 which is 
still the current rule for today.  Additionally, they adopted Camp’s proposal for a 
possession rule that allowed a team to retain possession of the ball without having to fight 
for it each possession as was the case in rugby.  This rule changed the face of American 
football from hence forward.  This one rule led to many further changes and the evolution 
of the game of football played in the United States today.  During the early 1880s, the 
rules convention and Camp created a down and distance rule that relegated the number of 
plays a team had to move the ball 5 or 10 yards.  This rule then led to the idea to paint the 
field with yard lines and create a grid on the field which led to the term “gridiron.”  Camp 
14 
 
continued to work to change the rules on the field, but he also became instrumental in 
changes off the field.19   
 As college football grew in popularity and began to create revenue, students no 
longer ran the football programs.  They focused on being players, and alumni like Walter 
Camp ran the program.  In a short time, Walter Camp successfully transformed a game 
developed and run by students into what John Sayle Watterson described as a 
“professional, systematic, businesslike enterprise.”20  Camp had dropped out of medical 
school and went to work in business for a clock company.  He learned about financial 
management and business organization and brought these skills to his next transformation 
of college football.  At Yale, Camp controlled the funds as treasurer of the athletic 
association and in 1899 he was hired officially to become the advisor on athletics.  Camp 
recognized that large amounts of money could be made on football and the students were 
not experienced enough to manage the program and play.  Camp became instrumental in 
the promotion of college football as a commercial entity that did not have student 
involvement as a priority of the activity.  He continued to expand his vision and formed a 
Graduate Advisors Committee that consisted of alumni from other institutions that played 
college football.  Walter Camp was turning college football into a business and showed 
little concern for academics: 
Neither Camp nor his colleagues had much sympathy for academic concerns, 
especially faculty interests or complaints.  In their view, students came to college 
for four years of social and educational immersion, but for Camp and his friends, 
the struggle for supremacy on athletic fields defined the college’s identity.21 
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The popularity of college football was bringing attention to institutions, but not for 
academic reasons.  Campus leaders used the popularity and exposure of football to 
promote themselves and their institution.  (This practice is still seen today during 
televised football games where the participating schools have several commercial 
advertisements showcasing their institution).  Football was a public relations vehicle for 
college presidents and chancellors.22  Harvard, Yale, and Princeton had the funding to run 
their programs without the need for much outside support.  However, other institutions 
had to look outside for financial assistance and “without fully realizing it, inexperienced 
faculty and presidents were setting themselves up to be held hostage by alumni and 
boosters.”23  
 Alumni and boosters became involved in the purchasing of supplies and 
equipment in exchange for tickets.  Colleges also made money by playing games on the 
road in big cities.  College football became a marketable product that was used by 
universities to increase prestige.  Colleges used the example set by Harvard, Yale, and 
Princeton to create winning teams and huge spectacles that generated revenue.  In many 
cases, however, fielding a winning team meant they needed to recruit players whose only 
role at the college was to participate in football.  These players never went to classes and 
eventually left the college after their playing time was finished.24  The desire to win 
games, increase revenue, and promote the college created the unique bond between 
college football programs and the institutions that supported them.  According to 
Frederick Rudolph, “Once the game enlisted the support of alumni and administration, 
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there was no stopping its growth.  For, once the sport had been accepted, the games had 
to be won.  Americans lacked a psychology for failure.”25 
 As football grew under the new rules developed by Walter Camp, the game also 
became more violent.  According to Watterson, faculty members at some colleges 
became concerned about the effect the game was having on students.26  Recognizing the 
conflict, Harvard’s president from 1869-1909, Charles Eliot, became the biggest 
opponent of college football.  Eliot and the faculty at Harvard between 1884 and 1906 
continually tried to abolish football at Harvard.  The faculty considered the game too 
violent and a distraction from the intellectual pursuits it considered the focus of a college 
education.  Since the athletics committee at Harvard was made up primarily of faculty, 
they did succeed in suspending football on occasion.  However, extreme pressure from 
students and alumni ultimately prevailed.  Harvard’s inability to gain control over 
football was directly related to Yale and Princeton’s unwillingness to reform football.  
For example, in 1885 the Harvard faculty athletic committee was able to convince the 
faculty to suspend football for a year.  However, Yale and Princeton were unwilling to go 
along with Harvard.  Since that meant Yale and Princeton would get to play for the 
championship, Harvard students and alumni began to pressure the committee.  Yielding 
to the pressure, the faculty at Harvard reconsidered and football was reinstated.27  Eliot 
was never able to totally ban football from Harvard, but he did go on a crusade to reform 
the sport.  He proposed changes such as not allowing freshmen to participate and having 
football played in alternating years or seasons so students could recover physically and 
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devote time to studies.  However, the concerns of academicians such as Eliot fell upon 
deaf ears as revenue streams grew and the popularity of the sport increased.   
 According to both Watterson and Rudolph, the power of football to draw attention 
to colleges, the involvement of alumni and boosters to pay for the program, and the desire 
to field a winning team created a situation where schools placed a premium on their 
athletic program in spite of any possible effects on the academic integrity of the college.28 
As college football continued to grow and spread to more institutions, it became a greater 
draw for players and fans.  Football players were considered among the elite members of 
the college community; conversations on campus were about the star athletes and not the 
most recent lectures from faculty members.  According to Frederick Rudolph, “the game 
became so widely adopted that for the first time since the founding of Harvard College in 
1636, colleges began to recognize the existence of intercollegiate relations.”29  Whether it 
was considered a distraction or not, college football became a recruiting tool to increase 
enrollment and a powerful public relations tool for the administration.  Despite its 
popularity, in the first thirty years after the first game in 1869, college football became 
embroiled in controversy.  Supporters viewed football as a way to develop character and 
build strength.  Opponents saw the game as a brutal distraction that had become too 
commercialized and professional.  The desire to have a winning team led to unethical 
practices to gain an edge and expectations of preferential treatment for star athletes: 
 One college football player so learned the price of his usefulness that without fear 
 of failure he presented his laundry bill to the team manager just before game time 
 with the words: “I cannot pay it.  You pay it or I do not play.”30     
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 In 1905, there were 18 deaths and 149 serious injuries related to football.31  These 
staggering data caught the attention of not only college presidents, but also the President 
of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt.  Roosevelt was an athlete himself and did not 
want to see football simply abolished.  Roosevelt intervened at that time and met with 
administrators at Harvard, Princeton, and Yale.  Roosevelt’s message was clear, ‘Reform 
the game or it will be outlawed, perhaps even by an Executive Order of the President 
himself.’32 
At its point of potential demise, football became a central issue for the country.  A 
meeting of the country’s most prestigious academic institutions and the highest office in 
the land became the collaboration needed to save college football.  From this meeting, 
changes were made and schools worked towards reform on the field.  In December of 
1905, Henry McCracken organized a conference that took reform to the next level.  As 
president of New York University, McCracken was concerned about the injuries and 
deaths that occurred as a result of football.  He made a plea to Harvard University 
President Charles Eliot to lead an effort to discuss reforming the playing rules of football.  
Eliot told MacCracken that he was not interested in reform, but only interested in 
abolition of football.  The reason Eliot gave to MacCracken for not participating in 
simple reform was that “deaths and injuries are not the strongest argument against 
football, that cheating and brutality are profitable is the main evil.”33  Despite Eliot’s 
unwillingness to participate, MacCracken pulled together a conference that involved 
institutions other than Harvard, Princeton, and Yale.   
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At the time, these three institutions were called the Big Three because they 
dominated the football landscape in the country and had formed their own association 
called the Intercollegiate Football Association (IFA).  This point is important because 
these three schools were the most prominent in the academic and athletic realm at the 
time.  Additionally, they were the greatest revenue generators of all the institutions 
participating in football, so other institutions rarely made decisions that challenged these 
three institutions.  According to Thelin, these three institutions were “most eligible to be 
leaders” in college football reform.34  MacCracken brought together many of the 
institutions that played football and together they decided to make real reforms to the 
game.  At a meeting on March 31, 1906, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the 
United States (IAAUS) was born.  The IAAUS persisted and eventually became the 
NCAA in 1910.  The organization spent the next few years working on reforming 
football on the field by creating new rules and systems that controlled the game.  
However, it turned to individual institutions and organizations such as the Carnegie 
Foundation to study and report on off the field issues such as academic integrity. 
 As the NCAA’s influence grew, so did the number of sports that conformed their 
rules to those put together by the NCAA.  By the end of World War I, the NCAA had 170 
institutional members and responsibility for 11 men’s sports.35  As football’s popularity 
grew, so did the preferential treatment, subsidizing of athletes, and violations of 
amateurism.  Football became a greater priority than the pursuit of academic endeavors 
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and academic leaders became tired of the conflict.36  The NCAA left these issues for the 
institutions to handle and it focused more on issues on the field since that was the original 
charge given to the IAAUS by President Roosevelt in 1905.  However, it did make 
continued requests to the Carnegie Foundation to do a study of intercollegiate athletics.  
Under the influence of Henry Pritchett, president of the Foundation, the Carnegie 
Foundation eventually began a study of intercollegiate athletics.   
 Pritchett’s work at the Foundation had led to other major studies such as the 
Abraham Flexner report of 1910 that studied medical schools and became a model for 
future research done by the foundation.37  Pritchett understood that football attracted 
students to the college.  However, Pritchett felt football was a distraction from the 
academic purpose of higher education.  He even went as far as to make a list of perceived 
evils in college athletics: 
 The paid coach; 
 Gate receipts; 
 Training tables (meals); 
 Special railroad cars; 
 Demoralizing publicity; 
 The unconscionable amount of time devoted to training; 
 The diluting of standards.38 
 
In May of 1923, Pritchett proposed to the Foundation’s board that it support a study of 
college athletics.  After Abraham Flexner’s study of medical education, the foundation 
had supported studies of legal education, engineering schools, and public school 
education.  The board did not show much interest in a study of athletics, although it 
funded a small study done by the Southern Association for the study of college sports in 
                                                 
36
 Watterson, College Football,  p. 158-159. 
37
 Ellen Lagemann, “Surveying the Professions,” in The History of Higher Education, second edition, ed. 
 Lester F. Goodchild and Harold S. Wechsler (Needham Heights, MA: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 
 395. 
38
 Watterson, College Football, p. 160. 
21 
 
the South.  After this study was awarded a small grant, other critics and reformers began 
to submit proposals.  Eventually in 1925, the foundation allowed Howard Savage to do a 
study of athletics in England.  After looking at Savage’s attention to detail in that report 
and after receiving a request from the NCAA to conduct a larger study of schools in the 
United States, it approved a study of college athletics by Savage to begin in 1926.  
Savage created a team of investigators that visited individual schools and conducted a 
number of interviews at colleges around the United States.  Savage’s report looked at 
college athletics including intramurals, training, and public relations.  The study looked 
overall at all athletics, but a focus on football continued to emerge as Savage’s research 
team investigated athletics at each college.  In particular, the section of the report 
dedicated to recruitment and subsidizing of athletes gained the most notoriety and 
controversy.  Of the 130 institutions studied by Savage’s team, very few received high 
marks for not subsidizing athletes or engaging in unethical recruitment practices.  
According to Watterson, the report primarily documented issues related to football and 
was the first study “that documented the various forms of largely surreptitious actions 
involved in supporting athletes.”39  Many of the activities cited in the report dealt with 
loans from boosters, on-campus and off-campus employment that resulted in very little 
work being done by the athlete, and the awarding of scholarships to athletes for non-
athletic purposes such as leadership.  The report also found instances of athletic 
departments using special tutors to help keep athletes eligible.   
 The Carnegie Report was released in late October of 1929.  Though the report 
competed in the media with the stock market crash, it received much attention.  
Newspapers ran stories about the report and college presidents began the task of 
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defending their institutions.  A common phrase uttered by presidents was, “If cheating 
took place, I did not know it in my official capacity.”40  Coaches and athletic directors 
showed disdain for the report and questioned the validity of the study.   
The report did not look to the NCAA or the faculty to address these issues.  
Savage looked to college presidents as the cause of the problem.  According to Savage, 
‘such are the position and the powers of the American College president, that once 
having informed himself of the facts, and if he had moral fortitude, he would eliminate 
the problem.’41  The Carnegie Report was the first comprehensive study of college 
athletics.  The major themes uncovered in the Carnegie Report were lack of presidential 
control over athletics, the commercialization of athletics, the limited role of the faculty in 
athletics, and the continued corruption of athletics as seen through preferential treatment 
and unethical recruiting practices.   
While the Carnegie Report was the greatest reform canon of the 1920s, it was the 
events at the University of Chicago in the 1930s that offered a rare example of 
presidential control over athletics.  When Robert Hutchins became president at the 
University of Chicago in 1929 he and faculty members at Chicago began the task of 
transforming the academic experience of undergraduates.  According to Watterson, “in 
much the same way that Harvard had revolutionized its curriculum with Eliot’s elective 
system, the University of Chicago abolished required courses for freshmen and 
sophomores and made class attendance voluntary.”42  Students at Chicago now had to 
follow a curriculum that led to a qualifying examination.  The increased rigor of 
academics at Chicago discouraged many athletes from playing football.  To coincide with 
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the academic changes, Chicago’s long time football coach and athletic director, Amos 
Alonzo Stagg, was required to resign due to his age.  Hutchins then hired a new athletic 
director, T. Nelson Metcalf.  Metcalf did not share the same love for big-time football 
that had been a part of Chicago’s history up to this point.  Between 1935 and 1939, the 
University of Chicago football team endured losing seasons and embarrassing losses to 
traditional rivals like Michigan, Harvard, and Illinois.  By 1939, Hutchins had convinced 
some trustees that Chicago should abolish football to protect its players from harm and to 
not embarrass the school any further.  He was able to convince people that despite a 
terrible football team for over a decade, Chicago’s fundraising had not dropped and by 
moving forward with abolition, Chicago would make a statement about the role of 
athletics at Chicago.43  Hutchins serves as a rare example of a college president becoming 
extremely involved in challenging the role of football at a university.  Unlike other 
reform efforts and other college presidents, Hutchins was not concerned with reforming 
athletics beyond Chicago.  He focused his attention on how football and academics were 
related at Chicago and made decisions according to their specific situation. 
Shortly after the University of Chicago abolished football in 1939, the NCAA, 
under the leadership of William B. Owen from Stanford, sought to define the amateur 
athlete and began to define the role of athletics in the academic realm.  In its bylaws, the 
organization began the process of establishing itself as a governing body to include 
enforcement of rules set forth by the association.  The organization had never seen itself 
as an enforcer of rules since its inception in 1906.  The NCAA had followed a tradition of 
Home Rule.  The Home Rule doctrine meant that each institution that was a member of 
the NCAA had autonomy over its athletic program including salaries, eligibility, ticket 
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sales, and building facilities.  The NCAA viewed itself as an organization that made 
recommendations, but did not enforce rules.44  As the revenue generating power of 
intercollegiate athletics grew, there became a need for some way of addressing the 
ongoing ethical misconduct of institutions that came as a result of increased focus on 
increasing revenue.  The power of college football had created a double standard on 
college campuses where athletes were showered with gifts and given special treatment 
behind the scenes, while the public image portrayed them as students first and athletes 
second.  The NCAA moved closer to becoming the enforcer of policies.  However, as 
Watterson claims, “only by taming football, the sport that produced gate receipts and 
glory, could the NCAA return to the ideal of the amateur sportsman.”45  The NCAA 
began to investigate violations of regulations and in 1948 put together the Principles for 
Conduct in intercollegiate athletics.  The code was meant to be a way of helping place 
athletics in its proper place at colleges and universities.  The following are the Principles 
for the Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics as stated in the Article III of the NCAA 
constitution of 1948: 
• Adherence to the definition of amateurism 
• The control and responsibility for the conduct of both intercollegiate and 
intramural athletics shall, in the last analysis, be exercised by the 
institution itself 
• Holding student-athletes to the same sound academic standards as the 
student body 
• Awarding financial aid without consideration for athletic ability 
• A policy of recruiting that basically prohibited a coach or anyone 
representing a member school from recruiting a prospective student-
athlete with the offer of financial aid or equivalent inducement46 
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The code also included a committee that looked at maintaining compliance and bringing 
institutions up on charges for violating the code and regulations of the NCAA.  One 
drawback was that the NCAA did not have a very good way of enforcing the rules.  Its 
only real sanction was expulsion from the association and that required a two-thirds 
majority vote of the members.  Within two years of its adoption, the Sanity Code was 
considered inoperable and the NCAA returned to the doctrine of Home Rule.  However, 
televising of college football convinced the NCAA to once again abandon the doctrine of 
Home Rule.   
In 1947, a TV station in Chicago began to regularly televise Notre Dame football 
games.  The University of Pennsylvania (Penn) had started televising its games in 1940.  
By 1950, major television networks were paying Notre Dame and Penn more than 
$75,000 annually for the rights to televise their football games.  Notre Dame and Penn 
continued to pursue more revenue through television contracts.  This sentiment was in 
sharp contrast to the NCAA’s view that the telecasting of games should be limited.47  The 
NCAA felt that televising games hurt ticket revenue at live games.  However, since the 
NCAA practiced the doctrine of Home Rule, it did not regulate television contracts and 
the individual institutions’ interest in negotiating for commercial television revenue.  In 
1950, Father Theodore Hesburgh addressed the NCAA convention and explained that 
television was not hurting ticket revenue at Notre Dame and that they were hiring a 
consultant to look at ways to promote Notre Dame through televising football games.  In 
the same year, Notre Dame negotiated a network television contract worth $185,000.  
Notre Dame’s ability to gain that much revenue from television caught the attention of 
the NCAA.  In turn, the NCAA formed a television committee and by 1951 had taken 
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away Notre Dame’s financial advantage from television by starting an experimental 
television package that was negotiated by the NCAA.48  Though the NCAA stated that 
the decision to get involved in televising games was not about money for the NCAA, 
Ronald Smith makes a different observation:  “Yet, even though money was not an 
uppermost consideration, evidently no thought was given to telecasting on the 
educational TV what was beginning to be introduced across the nation.”49  The NCAA’s 
decision to pursue revenue generating television contracts instead of utilizing non-profit 
educational television is evidence that money and commercialism did matter in its 
decision making.  The NCAA’s role in the televising of football games became the 
catalyst for its new role as an enforcement agency.  To address the enforcement of rules 
the NCAA officially adopted a 12-point code and a method of enforcing the rules in 1952.  
The Committee on Infractions was formed and established in 1954 and a full-time 
position was created to help administer the process.  The NCAA now had a way to 
address some of the problems that were going on with the increased commercialization of 
intercollegiate athletics.  
 The structure and influence of the NCAA continued to grow over the next couple 
of decades.  Increased opportunities for revenue from television contracts made 
successful football programs a high priority for many institutions.  With the growing 
influence of television, the shift of power in the NCAA began to lean towards athletic 
directors and presidents while faculty members saw their role diminish within the power 
structure of the NCAA, even though, faculty members served in key positions within the 
NCAA.  In fact, except for 1959-60 and 1965-66, all the presidents of the NCAA were 
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faculty members.  The involvement of faculty members was intended to keep a strong 
connection between academics and athletics.  However, it appears that despite their 
prominent positions in the NCAA, faculty members have historically had limited 
influence on sports except when they participated in them. 
 As demonstrated earlier, faculty members at Harvard and other institutions tried 
to suspend or abolish football in the early 1900s.  At times, they had success, but in all 
cases, the pressure from students, alumni, and boosters always led to the reinstatement of 
football.  Throughout the history of college football, its governing boards included 
faculty members and in some cases started out run by the faculty.  However, in most 
cases, the make up of these boards was changed to include alumni and administrators.  
Watterson states, “In the 1880s and early 1890s it was common for schools to have 
faculty athletic committees, but gradually many of those committees were enlarged or 
restructured to included alumni and students.”50   
 Attempts to give the faculty more control over the governance of athletics 
happened throughout the history of college football.  Almost 100 years before the Jan 
Kemp trial, faculty members from seven institutions that were part of the Ivy League held 
a conference called the Brown Conference to address reform and to reinstate faculty 
control over athletics.  They drafted a reform proposal for the Board of Directors at their 
institutions.  The proposal included the creation of committees dominated by faculty 
members.  These committees would oversee the operations and policies regarding 
athletics.  After several drafts, the members of the Brown Conference submitted their 
proposals to the Board of Directors of the institutions they represented.  None of the 
institutions approved the changes.  Watterson argued that even if the changes were made, 
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they would have been difficult to enforce.  Additionally, the lack of participation by 
Walter Camp and was a primary reason for the proposal failing.  According to Watterson, 
the Board of Directors of the institutions did not trust faculty control over athletics.51   
 What little role in athletics that the faculty attained in the early 1900s diminished 
completely by the 1980s.  After William Flynn, an athletic director, was elected president 
of the NCAA in 1978, only one more faculty member became president of the association 
(1989-90).52  
 The 1980s became a time of increased involvement by institutional presidents in 
the NCAA.  Alan Chapman, a faculty member at Rice University and former president of 
the NCAA, stated,  
 “Up until that time, presidents more or less had the attitude of keep things 
 running smoothly and don’t bother me, but then it became more and more 
 apparent that CEOs had to be more involved because in the end it was they 
 who were on the firing line, particularly when infractions started attracting 
 so much prominence from media.”53  
 
As money increasingly played a part in the evaluation of success and failure in college 
sports, the number of NCAA regulations violations also increased.   
 According to Watterson, the events at Southern Methodist University (SMU) in 
the 1980s created the biggest scandal among many during that decade.54 
The founders of SMU used football as a way to keep supporters happy and attract 
attention to the school.  The school was founded in 1911 and by 1922 it was temporarily 
suspended by the Southwest Conference and nearly expelled for illegally subsidizing 
their education.  According to Watterson, the conference held a vote to determine if SMU 
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should be expelled and the university was saved by one vote cast by its own 
representative.  Among the violations were secret loans, student activity scholarships, 
free books, and being paid for jobs that did not require work.55  SMU one the conference 
title the next year.  In the 1940s, SMU football was extremely successful and the 
university gained notoriety for its football teams and for its star players.  From 1951 to 
1976, SMU did not fare as well athletically; by the 1960s the Dallas Cowboys, a 
professional football team, became competition for SMU in terms of revenue generation.  
In 1973, after a change in presidents, the university reported itself to the Southwest 
Conference concerning violations in which players were paid to play.  SMU received a 
one-year probation.  The NCAA did an additional investigation and blacked out 
televising of SMU games and did not allow the University to participate in postseason 
bowl games.  Following its probation, SMU continued to pay players and entice top 
recruits to join SMU in exchange for cars and money.  The NCAA investigated again in 
the 1980s and following the investigation, SMU was charged with 80 allegations.  SMU 
had a history of major infractions in 1958, 1964, 1974, 1975, and 1981.  Despite the 
repeated penalties and probations at SMU, the University continued to violate rules and 
put athletics ahead of academics    
    SMU received the NCAA death penalty in 1987 as a result of its improprieties.  
The NCAA death penalty for SMU meant that the institution could no longer field a 
football team.  Watterson stated that “as long as an athletic culture held sway at an 
institution, the president acting alone would find it almost impossible to uproot.”56  
Watterson claimed that the eventual demise of SMU’s football program led to the 
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creation of the Knight Commission,57 arguing that incidents like those at SMU led to 
reform efforts in college football.  However, “colleges and college presidents had not 
come to grips with the gridiron creed of bigger is better, a mind-set that had almost from 
the beginning of college football led to flagrant abuses and periodic upheavals.”58  The 
increased involvement of administrators in the decision making kept the faculty members 
from being involved in the governance of athletics at universities. 
Faculty representatives were relegated to dealing with student-athlete welfare 
issues and not with major decision making on issues that were not necessarily academic 
in nature.  Vocal faculty members argued for the involvement of the faculty in athletic 
decision making.  Percy Bates, the faculty representative at the University of Michigan in 
1999, discussed the importance of faculty members in athletics when he was interviewed 
about subject for an article for The NCAA News.  Bates said, 
“It’s nice to have a perspective from someone there whose job doesn’t depend on 
the athletic success of the team.  That’s one of the things the faculty reps were 
insulated by- their jobs depended on their academic  endeavors and they could 
provide the viewpoint that the professionals couldn’t, as well as CEOs, who were 
more concerned with public image and so forth.”59 
 
Despite the arguments for more significant inclusion of the faculty in the governance of 
athletics, the power shifted to administrators, presidents, and benefactors.  The changes in 
the political structure of the NCAA coincided with a decade of scandals and issues 
brought on by the commercialization of college athletics.  As money became the 
dominant issue in the NCAA, the leadership reflected people more closely tied to the 
revenue streams.  Toward the end of the 1980s, reform and control of intercollegiate 
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athletics became a theme among leaders in higher education.  James Duderstadt, former 
president of the University of Michigan, stated, 
 it is time for universities to reassert control over intercollegiate athletics and 
 to realign them with the academic priorities of higher education.  Key in this 
 effort will be the difficult but essential task of resisting the pressure-whether from 
 the media or politicians, trustees or alumni, fans or the public at large, or even 
 some of our coaches, athletic directors, and university presidents- to transform 
 college sports into an entertainment industry.60 
 
 As a result of the scandals in the 1980s, the trustees of the John S. and James L. 
Knight Foundation created a commission on intercollegiate athletics in 1989.  The 
trustees were concerned that the abuses in college athletics posed a threat to the integrity 
of higher education.  (The Jan Kemp trial was one of the scandals referred to by the 
Knight Foundation)  The commission’s interest was to place the role of intercollegiate 
athletics in its proper perspective.  Its definition of the proper perspective was as a 
spectator sport that fans could enjoy but also did not engage in behaviors that threatened 
the academic integrity of higher education.  The Knight Commission’s focus was on big-
time athletics programs.  The commission defined big-time athletics programs as those 
“institutions fighting for the big bucks that television exposure and bowl games and 
NCAA tournaments brought.”61  Data provided by surveys conducted for the Knight 
Foundation by various research groups provided evidence to justify the need for major 
reform in intercollegiate athletics.  Some highlights of the data are as follows: 
 In the 1980s, 109 colleges and universities were censured, sanctioned, or put 
on probation by the NCAA; 
 57 institutions were at the NCAA’s top competitive level; 
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 Nearly a third of present and former professional football players responding 
to a survey said they accepted illicit payments while in college and more than 
half said they saw nothing wrong with the practice; 
 Another survey showed that among the 100 big-time schools, 35 had 
graduation rates under 20 percent for their basketball players and 14 had the 
same low rate for their football players.62 
 
The Knight Commission referenced the work of the Carnegie Report of 1929 and 
acknowledged that the situation had become worse over the 60 years between the two 
reform efforts because of the millions of dollars television poured into college athletics.  
The commission viewed its challenge as winning support for realistic reform efforts that 
would bring all institutions together. 
 The commission proposed a model or guideline for reform, the one-plus-three 
model.  In this model, the one is presidential control.  The idea is that the president 
should have ultimate authority over athletics and should direct control toward academic 
integrity, financial integrity, and independent certification.  Like the Carnegie Report of 
1929, the Knight Commission viewed the key player in reform as the institutional 
president.  Also, like the Carnegie Report of 1929, the commission did not seek to 
address individual problems on specific campuses.  The commission made no claims that 
its recommendations would solve all the problems in intercollegiate athletics.  The co-
chair for the Knight Commission was President Emeritus of the University of Notre 
Dame, Theodore Hesburgh.  In creating the commission, the foundation acknowledged 
that the millions of dollars from television contracts was a key factor in creating problems 
in intercollegiate athletics.  In contrast, Hesburgh was the driving force behind Notre 
Dame negotiating individually for its own television contract and calling any efforts to 
share revenue during television negotiations in the 1950s as socialistic.  In response to 
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Hesburgh’s views in the 1950s, Ronald A. Smith wrote, “Hesburgh was Robin Hood’s 
antithesis, for he was trying, unsuccessfully, to create a Super Conference to put control 
of television money solely in the hands of the big-time power schools.”63  The irony of 
the Knight Commission was that Hesburgh was a proponent of big-time athletic prowess 
and was now leading a commission that was seeking to attack the power and control he 
had achieved during his time as president.   
 Critics of the Knight Commission believed that the initial intent of the 
commission was good, but in the end it succumbed to the revenue-generating power of 
college athletics and the NCAA.  For example, The Drake Group served as a major critic 
of the Knight Commission.  The Drake Group was formed in 1999 to look at radical 
reforms to intercollegiate athletics.  The group published essays and statements that 
pushed their reform agenda.  Unlike the Knight Commission’s focus on television 
revenue, The Drake Group believed that the only way to reform athletics was through 
disclosing of academic records so institutions could not hide academic deficiencies 
among athletes.64  Like the Carnegie Report of 1929, following the Knight Commission’s 
reports, institutions made some changes and took a closer look at policies.  Graduation 
rates increased somewhat, but not to a level to state that major reform had taken place.  In 
2007, USA Today reshuffled the ranking of the top 25 teams in college football by 
graduation rates.  The Division I-A average at the time was 66% for college football 
players with schools such as Boston College and Michigan rated in the top ten.  The 
University of Georgia was ranked 25th with a graduation rate of 41%.65  The effectiveness 
of the Knight Commission’s reform efforts is debatable.  Like its predecessors in reform, 
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it focused on the presidential control and not on commercialization as a reform 
component. 
 The Knight Commission is now working in collaboration with the NCAA and 
never became involved in the issues around revenue generation.  It is the power of the 
market and many of the external influences James Duderstadt referred to in his book, 
Intercollegiate Athletics and the American University: A University President's 
Perspective that effected change in the relationship between academic priorities and 
athletic priorities.  J. Douglas Toma, however, viewed the relationship between athletics 
and the college differently.  According to Toma, college football is ingrained in the 
culture of a university.  He refers to institutions with major revenue-producing football 
programs as Football U.66  Toma argued that “spectator sports are central in institutional 
life, providing the campus with a distinctive identity and popular appeal.”67  According to 
Toma, universities with big-time football choose between separating out athletics or 
taking advantage of their program.  In other words, athletics is used as a source of 
community and as a centerpiece for the campus culture or it is isolated and deemphasized.   
He argued that universities overwhelmingly choose to embrace and use athletics to 
promote the university.  According to Toma, embracing athletics has become mandatory 
because to ignore athletics puts the university at risk of lacking control over athletics.  
Lack of control can lead to violations and sanctions in relation to NCAA policies.  
According to Toma, “the trade-off for institutions for sports-enhanced external support, 
political and otherwise, is often diminished institutional control over intercollegiate 
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athletics.”68  Rick Telander argued that universities created the spectacle of college 
football and the corrupt activities are a part of maintaining a big-time college football 
program.  Telander used the University of Nebraska as an example of this financial 
spectacle by stating, “it has produced a football team, as other universities have, that 
carries so much emotional freight for so many people that it has become an awesome 
economic force.”69    
 The University of Georgia (UGA) is a model for the type of football program 
described by Telander, Toma, and Duderstadt.  Nearly 115 years ago, the University of 
Georgia (UGA) played its first college football game against Mercer College on Herty 
Field.  Herty Field is located on north campus in the original academic quadrangle of the 
University of Georgia campus. The university then organized a game with Auburn 
University in Atlanta, Georgia.  The game between Georgia and Auburn became known 
as the “South’s oldest collegiate rivalry.”70  College football at the University of Georgia 
has grown in popularity, size, tradition, and influence.  How important is college football 
to the University of Georgia?  Former head football coach and athletic director at the 
University of Georgia, Vince Dooley wrote, “Athletics is one of the things we do in the 
name of the University of Georgia.  It’s the way we fly our colors.  It’s one of the 
primary reasons UGA people say, I bleed Red and Black!”71 
 Football began to be used as a mechanism for increasing the university’s national 
exposure in the 1920s.  By playing games against national powerhouse programs like 
Harvard, Yale, and Chicago, UGA attempted to bring attention to the institution for non-
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football reasons.  In 1929, the same year as the Carnegie Report, the University of 
Georgia established an independent Georgia Athletic Association.  According to Thomas 
Dyer, the University of Georgia athletic association “in many ways took authority over 
intercollegiate athletics out from under the umbrella of the university administration and 
the renewal of the charter for the association in 1949 confirmed that extra-institutional 
forces would for another twenty years shape the development of intercollegiate 
athletics.”72   
 When the first football game at the university was played there were maybe 100 
spectators in attendance.  Today, football is played in Sanford Stadium which hosts a 
capacity crowd of over 92,000 people.  The evolution of football at the University of 
Georgia included a focus on popular exposure and revenue generation.  Boosters and 
alumni have driven revenues to new levels as highlighted in Richard Ernsberger’s book, 
Bragging Rights: A Season Inside the SEC.  He notes that revenues from college football 
have become so important that practically every school in the Southeastern Conference 
has recently expanded its stadium and added scores of luxury boxes for wealthy 
boosters.73  John Thelin’s analysis of the University of Georgia as a booster campus 
presents the dilemma past presidents faced when the needs of the college football 
program came into conflict with the academic mission and financial stability of the 
institution.74  In his analysis, Thelin also relies on Thomas Dyer’s research on the 
University of Georgia as evidence of the evolution of these dilemmas.   
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 According to Dyer, the growth and prominence of college football at UGA 
stemmed from the overall changes the University experienced at the turn of the 20th 
century.  In 1898, Walter Barnard Hill was named Chancellor of the University of 
Georgia and he brought with him an agenda which included transforming the University 
into a more utilitarian institution that served society.  In a speech in 1905, Hill stated that 
the University “will connect its activities more closely with the business and life of the 
people.”75  Following Hill’s tenure, President David C. Barrow continued the 
modernization effort at the University.  According to Dyer, intercollegiate athletic 
competition became “an additional source of stress inevitably accompanying expansion 
and modernization.”76  Football served as a public relations tool and once it survived the 
on the field reform to curb the violence in the early 1900s, its popularity grew and began 
to contribute to the University’s public persona.  Dyer continues, 
 With the popularization of football, however, and the accompanying improvement 
 in modes of communication, the exploits of athletes became available to 
 thousands who totally lacked connections with any college, but followed 
 collegiate teams with a fervor which matched that of the alumni.77 
 
John Thelin included UGA in his analysis of the populist booster campus circa 1929-
1946.  The populist booster campuses saw institutional growth as an extension of the 
aspirations of the state government.  According to Thelin, this was decidedly so in the 
Western and Southern regions of the United States.  In his analysis of four universities, 
one of them being UGA, he stated that “these cases created the models of funding, 
coaching, and recruiting that characterized big-time college sports after 1930.”78  Thelin’s 
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analysis offered one important perspective of the role of college football at the University 
of Georgia.  
 The newly established prominence of intercollegiate athletics presented a number 
of conflicts between the academic integrity of the institution and the desire for athletic 
prowess.  Dyer cites one example where the University of Georgia Athletic Association 
realized that prospective athletes who were unable to attain regular admission into the 
University in the College of Arts and Sciences could gain admission into the Law School 
because it had little or no admissions requirements.79  In his research, Dyer cites similar 
conflicts and in each case the president or administrators involved deferred to the desires 
of the athletic association because they needed the support of key alumni and the 
exposure of athletics to help increase academic offerings.   
 The creation of the University of Georgia Athletic Association is an important 
event in the evolution of athletics at the university.  Additionally, it is important to this 
study because it established the significance of college football at the university.  Since 
the Athletic Association was a private entity, it was free to make decisions concerning 
athletics outside the university’s umbrella of control.  The Athletic Association board 
primarily consisted of influential alumni and though some faculty members were on the 
board, the private status of the association diminished their involvement.  The athletic 
association also served as an external form of pressure on the athletic department that was 
in conflict with the academic mission of the university.  For example, during World War 
II, the dilemma arose for then President Harmon Caldwell to decide whether or not 
football should be played during wartime.  The institution, with the support of the board, 
continued to play football even to the tune of a significant financial deficit.  The deficit 
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forced Caldwell to contact prominent alumni to give money to make up for the deficit.  In 
addition, to subsidize the funding of the football program during wartime, Caldwell 
agreed to turn over student activity fees to the athletic association board to make up for 
lost revenue and increased expenses.80   
The arrival of President Omer Aderhold in 1951 signaled a commitment to 
becoming a modern university with a focus on research.81 According to Dyer, these 
competing forces played a significant role in creating the university culture and 
environment for the decades that followed his presidency.  With the transition into Fred 
Davison’s presidency in 1967, the focus on research and prestige continued to create the 
institutional context surrounding the Jan Kemp trial. 
 During the timeframe leading up to the Jan Kemp trial, faculty members were 
involved in disputes with President Davison.  In the 1970s, faculty became the protesters 
because during the time period of 1971-1973, Davison created what Jan Kemp’s lawyer, 
Hue Henry, described as a climate of fear.82  Davison was meeting opposition from all 
the ranks, but he also used tremendous pressure to snuff out any opposition.  Alan Siegel, 
a UGA student, described UGA under Davison as an oppressive climate in his 
valedictorian speech.  Siegel’s speech became an attack on Davison and his 
administration.  Siegel addressed Davison during his speech, stating that the President 
was “exerting pressure in an effort to muzzle diverse opinions.”83  
 During Davison’s tenure 14 deans and department heads resigned from their 
position.  The rebellions and resignations were the result of a long struggle between the 
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faculty and the administration over Davison’s new promotion and tenure standards.  In 
1971, in his State of the University Address, Davison stated that in order to manage the 
budget better and to be more pragmatic, he was instituting new promotion and tenure 
standards.  Davison drew fire from the faculty because the new standards deemphasized 
teaching and emphasized research.  The faculty detested Davison’s impersonal approach 
and unwillingness to involve faculty in changes.  The tension continued and became such 
a powder keg that then Governor Jimmy Carter had to step in and urge the administration 
and the faculty to work out their differences.84  Davison continued to tout the university’s 
increased research dollars and enrollment as the shining points of the university and his 
administration.  To Davison’s credit, the university experienced exponential growth 
during his tenure of nearly two decades.  However, his push for growth in scientific 
research and desire for prestige came at the expense of his relationship with the faculty.  
On the inside, faculty morale was at a low point.  A statement in the Athens Observer 
indicative of the time came from an English professor, Marion Montgomery.  He stated in 
response to Davison’s boasts of enrollment and expansion, 
  by such an argument for quality, we may consider that our problems with 
 inflation and depression are rapidly solved by our welfare statistics.  More  money 
 is spent each year on welfare, and more names are added to the welfare roll, so 
 therefore we are rapidly expanding and progressing, to use two of President 
 Davison's favorite words. . . better teachers and better students proved by the fact 
 of better grades. Nonsense.85 
 
 In 1977, Virginia Trotter was named as Vice President for Academic Affairs.  In 
Davison fashion, she immediately told department heads and faculty to not talk poorly of 
Davison or the institution in public.  Trotter was part of what Athens lawyer Hue Henry 
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dubbed the puppet cabinet.86  Based on his experiences suing the university, Henry 
claimed that it was evident that many of the administrators at the university were not 
hired to be free thinkers but to serve as messengers for President Davison.  Jerrold 
Footlick outlined these issues in his book Truth and Consequences: How Colleges and 
Universities Meet Public Crises.  In one chapter of Footlick’s book, he analyzed the 
public relations issues that arose as a result of the Jan Kemp trial and how the university 
managed them.  His perception of the Davison administration was that “Davison and a 
small coterie of advisors ran the university with little external input or opposition.”87  The 
fallout from the Jan Kemp trial ultimately exposed problems that occurred during 
Davison’s presidency. 
Summary of the Literature 
 For as long as football has been a part of collegiate culture, controversy and 
scandals have played a part in its history.  Regardless of their position, university 
administrators have struggled when faced with the seemingly competing interests of 
college football and academic integrity.   
 Football began as an extracurricular activity primarily played by students.  With 
the influence of Walter Camp and administrators’ realization that football could generate 
tremendous revenue, the sport quickly became a protected and defended component of 
many colleges.  Camp introduced new rules on the field and established ways to organize 
and market the sport off the field.  Presidents and campus leaders used football to gain 
exposure for their institution.  Due to the large expense of running a football program, 
faculty members and presidents allowed alumni and boosters to become involved in 
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supporting the programs financially.  However, with the financial support came 
expectations such as tickets for games and involvement in decisions.   
 Using the momentum of popular support, football thrived at colleges.  Even the 
violent nature of the sport and the many deaths it caused did not stop the sport from 
continuing to grow.  When faced with possible abolition by the President of the United 
States, Theodore Roosevelt, college football made adjustments, but kept moving forward.  
A significant result of this event was the formation of the IAAUS which eventually 
became the NCAA.  Football was now legitimately aligned with colleges and had the 
official backing of a national organization to assist in the development of the sport.   
 The powerful influence of football over the masses meant that colleges placed it 
at a high level of importance in culture and operation of the institution.  In many cases, 
this meant that the need to succeed in football superseded the academic mission of the 
college and the integrity of its academic programs.   
 Henry Pritchett became concerned with the impact football had on higher 
education.  He used his influence to convince the Carnegie Foundation to conduct a study 
of intercollegiate athletics was needed.  In 1929, the Carnegie Foundation supported and 
published a study entitled American College Athletics.  The study was led and written by 
Howard Savage.  The study uncovered 4 major concerns within college athletics; lack of 
presidential control, commercialization, limited role of the faculty, and corruption 
through preferential treatment of athletes.  How important was the Carnegie Report of 
1929?  John Thelin argues that “any substantive discussion about the reform of 
intercollegiate athletics in American higher education starts and eventually returns to 
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American College Athletics.88  The Carnegie Report established the core problems seen 
when athletics and academic integrity come into conflict.  This report served as the 
foundation for future reform efforts. While the Carnegie Report established some of the 
major issues, Robert Hutchins used his power as president to change the fate of football 
as one of the country’s most prestigious academic and athletic institutions. 
 By increasing the expected academic rigor a student faced at the University of 
Chicago, Hutchins successfully created an environment where students chose academics 
over football.  In order for them to succeed at the institution academically, they couldn’t 
focus the needed energy on participating in football at the level expected by coaches.  
Once the football team started losing games, it became easy for Hutchins to convince 
trustees to abolish football.  While this was a truly uncommon means of reforming 
college athletics, it serves as an important example of how a university president can 
have power and influence over the role of athletics at an institution. 
 Following the Carnegie Report and the abolishment of football at the University 
of Chicago, the NCAA created rules to govern the role of athletics within the academic 
mission.  They created a code in 1948 to define the conduct of institutions, administrators, 
and athletes.  However, once the NCAA challenged its own core values of athletics, it 
realized it had no real power to enforce rules or influence institutions to follow the rules.  
It was not until football games became televised that the NCAA garnered an opportunity 
to become an enforcement agency.   
 College football and the NCAA grew as the popularity of television grew.  The 
NCAA controlled television contracts.  The amount of revenue involved in these 
contracts was enormous for the time.  Even when given the opportunity to use free public 
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television to telecast games, the NCAA and universities never gave it consideration.  The 
potential revenue generating opportunities were too much to pass on.  Money played a 
significant role in the decision making of administrators concerning college athletics.  
With the NCAA and universities involved in television contracts and tremendous revenue 
streams, the role of the faculty in the governance of the NCAA and on athletic boards 
diminished.  A closer look at the history of college football shows that even though the 
faculty was in a seemingly important position to effect change in the athletic realm, the 
reality on their own campuses was that the people closest to the revenue streams for 
athletics were still in control of athletics.   
 The focus on revenue and athletic prowess led to a decade of major scandals 
involving universities like SMU and the University of Georgia.  SMU started its football 
program in order bring attention to the university.  It used the program and pumped a lot 
of money ethically and unethically into athletics.  Eventually, SMU became the first 
institution to receive the NCAA’s death penalty for sports programs and they have only 
recently begun to play football again.  The theme of commercialization and revenue 
generation is found throughout the history of college football.  The SMU case is 
important because it happened along a similar timeline to the Jan Kemp trial.  Also, the 
decision of administrators at SMU is comparable to the issues that evolved during the Jan 
Kemp trial.   
 As a result of scandals in the 1980s, the Knight Foundation formed a commission 
1989 to address reform needs in college athletics.  The commission tried to place athletics 
in the proper perspective at colleges and universities.  The commission established a one-
plus-three model.  The commission’s idea was that presidential control of athletics was 
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key to successfully placing it within the academic context of an institution.  The 
commission’s work is the most recent major reform effort in the United States.  What is 
significant about the Knight Commission’s work is that the issues identified by the 
commission are in essence the same issues identified by Howard Savage in 1929.     
 It appears that since Theodore Roosevelt nearly abolished football in 1905, a 
major reform effort has taken place approximately every 20 years.  The Carnegie Report 
started the college football reform canon in 1929.  In 1948, the NCAA attempted to 
establish a code of conduct for colleges concerning the role of athletics, but failed 
because it lacked the ability to enforce rules.  In 1974, George Hanford’s report for the 
American Council on Education argued for more involvement from the faculty in 
governance of athletics and pointed out that many institutions were losing money form 
athletics.  Last, the Knight Commission published its reform model in 1989.  Does this 
mean a new major reform effort is about to form in 2009?  The trend seems to point to 
this possibility.   
 The decisions made concerning college football throughout history point to 
commercialization of the sport as a major influence.  Additionally, the desire to increase 
the exposure of the school through the success of sports teams led administrators to 
justify turning a blind eye to academic integrity issues for the sake of increasing athletic 
prowess was justified.  In studying the history of the University of Georgia, the decision 
to play football during wartime and the establishment of the Athletic Association as a 
private entity were both influenced by the external pressures from boosters and internal 
pressures to increase revenue and enrollment.  A study of the Jan Kemp case adds to the 
history of college football and attempts to reform.  It also establishes the decisions of 
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administrators that led to the most recent reform efforts in college athletics.  Additionally, 
studying this case within the context of the history of college football may lend insight 
into what issues to look for when the next major reform effort in college football comes 
around because if history is a guide, then the next major challenge to college football is 
coming.   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 The method of this study involves using an historical method that includes 
document analysis and interviews.  These procedures were used to gain knowledge of the 
evolution of the problems that led to the Jan Kemp trial.  The analysis of court documents, 
multimedia publications, and additional primary sources from before, during, and after 
the trial helped to describe the context of the situation during a ten year span that 
included the trial and primarily Jan Kemp’s term of employment at the university.  The 
data was used to interpret how the decisions of administrators were affected by the 
context.  Additionally, interviews were conducted to offer personal insight from people 
close to the situation.  These interviews provided details that give extended depth to the 
textual analysis of the trial.  To collect the data necessary to study this case, the following 
procedures were utilized: 
1. A purposeful sample of people with unique knowledge to the Jan Kemp trial were 
chosen for interviews; 
2. An interview protocol and a list of questions were developed; 
3. Interviews were scheduled and conducted; 
4. An extensive amount of legal and personal documents belonging to J. Hue Henry 
were collected and analyzed; 
5. Primary sources from the University of Georgia archives were analyzed; 
6. Secondary sources were analyzed in relation to their relevance to the trial. 
 
Deciding on a Purposeful Sample of Documents and People 
 To understand the events in and surrounding the Jan Kemp trial, it was necessary 
to use a purposeful sample of documents and people because of their unique connection 
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to the situation.  Merriam explains that “purposeful sampling is based on the assumption 
that the investigator wants to discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore must 
select a sample from which the most can be learned.”  The first step in purposive 
sampling is creating criteria to define the importance of the samples being chosen.89   
 For this study, a document or person had to provide unique information related to 
events in or surrounding the Jan Kemp trial.  In addition, information that specifically 
addressed how the people involved made decisions related to the intersection of 
academics and athletics were deemed valuable to the study.  A meeting with Jan Kemp’s 
attorney, J. Hue Henry, started the process of identifying documents and people with 
unique access to and knowledge of the case.  Following the meeting, Henry donated his 
files and personal documents from the trial for use in this study.  These documents 
included court transcripts, depositions, evidence used during the trial, newspaper and 
magazine clippings, audiotapes, and personal notes taken by the lawyers.  In total the 
files donated by Henry filled three 30-gallon plastic containers and three additional 
banker’s boxes.  These documents were the foundation of the study.  A majority of the 
information used to analyze the case came from these documents.  After further analysis 
of these documents, information emerged that led to seeking out additional samples of 
data and evidence.  The data from these documents also contributed to the creation of 
interview questions used in this study and deciding on participants to interview.   
 After reviewing the files, I determined a number of people I wanted to interview 
in order to gain additional insight into the trial.  First, I saw my own perspective as a fan 
and supporter of college football.  I sought out the perspectives of Jan Kemp and Hue 
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Henry to understand why they chose to challenge the system of college football at the 
University of Georgia.  Fred Davison and Virginia Trotter were both decease at the time 
of this study so I relied on textual evidence to gain their perspective on the trial and the 
relationship between college football and the University of Georgia.  I then attempted to 
make contact with Leroy Ervin, but was unsuccessful in finding him.  He did conduct a 
lecture at Georgia Perimeter College in 2006 and I used that lecture as some of the basis 
to gain his perspective on the relationship between college football and the University of 
Georgia.  I also relied on his testimony in court transcripts and the transcripts of 
interviews done with him following the trial.  There was another administrator who 
worked in Developmental Studies at that the time of the trial.  I asked the person for an 
interview and they declined.  They spoke with me off the record about some issues and I 
used that information to help me find additional resources and perspectives.  The person 
said the incident was a difficult time and did not wish to re-live it.   
Interview Protocol and Questions 
 Interview questions were created and interviewees were identified for the 
interview portion of the study, based on their unique perspective on the Jan Kemp trial 
and the relationship between academics and football.  The questions were intended to 
gain the perspective of the interviewee in relation to the following criteria: 
1. The participant’s views on intercollegiate athletics and college football; 
2. The participant’s perceptions of college football at the University of Georgia; 
3. The participant’s perceptions of the campus environment and the Jan Kemp affair; 
4. The participant’s view of individuals at the University of Georgia who were 
involved in the trial. 
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The questions were reviewed by the dissertation advisor and the Georgia State 
Institutional Review Board.  After changes were made, the questions were ready to be 
used in an interview setting.   
 Following the creation of the interview questions, the researcher developed an 
interview protocol and began to contact interviewees.  The pre-interview protocol 
consisted of contacting the interviewees via the phone or email.  Second, the researcher 
explained the study and the purpose of the interview and what role the interviewee played 
in the study.  Third, confirmation of the participation from the interviewee was requested.  
If the interviewee agreed to participate, a time, date, and location of the interview was 
established.  Finally, the researcher explained the confidentiality of the interview and that 
the interviewee could choose not to participate or stop participation at any point in time.  
All interviews were conducted in locations convenient to the interviewee.  For example, 
Jan Kemp was interviewed in her house and Hue Henry was interviewed in a restaurant 
next to his law office.   
 The protocol for the actual interview consisted of following a set procedure as 
well as allowing for an open dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee.  The 
interviews began with an explanation of the study and the researcher’s view on the 
interviewee’s significance to the study.  Then, following some discussion and 
background information, the researcher began asking questions.  A list of questions used 
to guide the interviews is located in the Appendix A.    
Analysis of Hue Henry’s Legal Files 
 A major component of this study involved analyzing court documents, legal briefs, 
and documents found in the files of Hue Henry.  Henry was Kemp’s attorney during the 
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trial and donated his files for use in this study.  Henry and the researcher are 
acquaintances and this relationship allowed the researcher an opportunity to gain access 
to Henry’s personal files.  For example, the audio tape of a meeting that was secretly 
recorded by a former faculty member in Developmental Studies was included in the files.  
The transcripts of the meeting were used as evidence in the trial because the meeting 
involved faculty members and key administrators in academic affairs and the athletic 
department.  In addition, the arguments in the case covered a number of issues directly 
related to the intersection of academics and college football.  There was a lot of text 
dedicated to issues surrounding Kemp’s performance as a teacher, issues of tenure, and 
Leroy Ervin’s tenure process.  For the purposes of this study, I focused on evidence that 
related to the intersection of college football and academic integrity.  The researcher 
analyzed documents with the intent of identifying information that gave insight into the 
decision making of administrators and faculty members in relation to the athletic program 
and Developmental Studies.   
 The first step in analyzing Henry’s legal files was organizing the files for use in 
this study and determining the importance of information to the study.  A document’s 
importance to the study was gauged by its relation to the research questions discussed in 
Chapter 1.  As a reminder, these questions were: 
1. How did the themes identified by the Carnegie Report in 1929 play a role in the 
Jan Kemp affair and the relationship between academic integrity and athletics? 
2. What internal and external factors created an environment for this scandal and 
how did it affect the decision making of key administrators? 
 
 The first documents analyzed were the depositions of Jan Kemp and Leroy Ervin.  
The initial questioning of these two key figures established arguments for both sides of 
the case.  In their depositions, Kemp and Ervin answered questions concerning their 
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employment at the University of Georgia, their professional relationship, and their 
perspectives on the reasoning for Kemp’s dismissal.  Of particular importance were the 
policies and actions that involved athletes.  From these initial depositions, the lawyers 
built their arguments for the trial and the same was done to build the arguments for this 
study.  After analyzing the depositions, the researcher turned to the opening statements 
and the testimonies of Jan Kemp and Leroy Ervin.  The combination of these documents 
established three specific issues involving college football players and academic integrity.  
The first was the role of Developmental Studies and its relationship to athletics at the 
University of Georgia.  Second, the admission and exiting of athletes at the University of 
Georgia emerged as an important issue.  Last, there were additional factors concerning 
the preferential treatment of athletes.  Once these three major themes were established, 
the next step was to begin analyzing documents to look for evidence that answered the 
research questions and why particular decisions were made.           
The University of Georgia Archives 
 The University of Georgia has extensive archives related to the Jan Kemp trial 
and other key individuals including presidential papers, newspaper articles, minutes from 
committee meetings, and other important evidence.  The archives at the University of 
Georgia have dedicated a specific section to what the staff titled The Jan Kemp Affair.  
Within this section were boxes containing mainly newspaper clippings and artifacts from 
the trial.  These documents provided internal and external perspectives on the trial and 
the relationship between the university and college football.  After explaining the study to 
archivists at the University of Georgia, they identified additional volumes they believed 
valuable to this research.  Of particular importance to this study, were copies of the 
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faculty newsletter, The Columns.  The Columns was an important means of 
communication during the time.  The Columns highlighted the increased involvement of 
the faculty following the Jan Kemp trial.  When analyzing documents in the archives, the 
same research questions were used to establish the importance of documents.   
Analysis of Secondary Sources 
 The secondary sources analyzed in the case provided additional perspectives that 
gave insight to the research questions established in this study.  A significant amount of 
research showed that historically college football has created controversy in relation to its 
role at colleges and universities.  The efforts throughout history to reform college football 
are important to this study because they create a context for the decision making at the 
University of Georgia concerning its athletes.  Again, the research questions developed 
for this study were used as a guideline to decide on the importance of secondary source 
information.  For instance, John Thelin discusses the creation of the University of 
Georgia’s Athletic Association as a private entity in his book Games Colleges Play.  
Thelin’s perspective on this event is important to the study of the Jan Kemp case because 
he writes about it within a larger national and historical context.   
 As information emerged from the primary sources, answers to how and why 
administrators made their decisions concerning athletes also emerged.  In analyzing 
secondary sources, I looked for comparable situations where administrators made 
decisions for the same reasons.
54 
 
CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE  
 Five key issues that directly involved the intersection of academics and athletics 
evolved during the trial: the creation and purpose of the Developmental Studies program 
along with its placement within the university structure; promotion and tenure in the 
Developmental Studies program; the admission of athletes into the Developmental 
Studies program and the university; the exiting of athletes from the Developmental 
Studies program; and other preferential treatment given to athletes. 
 Additionally, analysis of the trial showed that race was a component that needs to 
be studied more closely.  The trial concerned the relationship between college football 
and the Developmental Studies program.  In most cases, the football players in 
Developmental Studies were African-American.  The Developmental Studies was also 
created to help minority students with their transition to college.    
Developmental Studies 
 Race was certainly a factor in the creation of the Developmental Studies program.  
In 1973 the Board of Regents for the state of Georgia approved an initiative that created 
developmental studies programs at all institutions within the University System of 
Georgia as part of the state’s desegregation plan.  In addition, this initiative was aimed at 
increasing the enrollment and graduation of minority students in college.  Between 1960 
and 1972, the state had seen a tremendous amount of growth in the number of students 
attending college.  As more students came to college, it appeared that many of these 
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students were lacking skills in the areas of mathematics, reading, and English to prepare 
them for the academic rigor of a college education.  For example, it was estimated that 
between 10 and 25 percent of the students entering the University System in 1971-72 
were lacking the fundamental skills needed to succeed in college level courses.  The 
Board of Regents set up the program with the following initial guidelines: 
1. The Special Studies program will be implemented throughout the University 
System no later than the Fall Quarter of 1974. 
2. Any entering freshman scoring a combined verbal and math score of 650 or 
below on the SAT will be given additional tests to determine skill deficiencies 
which might require participation in the Special Studies program. 
3. Institutions may specify higher standards on the SAT and the Comparative 
Guidance and Placement Program of the CEEB for Special Studies participants. 
4. Further testing will initially include, but not be limited to, the CGP test. 
5. Courses in this program will include English, Reading, and Mathematics. 
6. Students will be required only to enter the course related to their individual 
deficiency.90 
 
 In his testimony during the trial, Leroy Ervin discussed that in the beginning, all 
institutions with Special Studies programs in Georgia were given basic guidelines such as 
these and that each institution could go beyond the minimum standards set by the Board 
of Regents based on the mission of the institution and the type of students they served.  
When Ervin assumed the role of Director of Developmental Studies, he saw the mission 
of the department as “to not only meet the mandate of the Board of Regents in the spirit 
of what Developmental Studies was created for, but we also had to look at and develop 
that program in the context of the environment that we found ourselves.”91  
The Developmental Studies program was an insulated office under the Vice-
President of Academic Affairs.  Unlike other academic units at the university, it was not 
based in a school or college such as the Law School or the College of Arts and Sciences.  
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Students in Developmental Studies generally had a deficiency in reading, English, or 
mathematics.  They spent time taking classes in Developmental Studies and within an 
allotted time period of four quarters would either exit from the program into a school or 
college at the university or be dismissed from the university.92  The Developmental 
Studies program consisted of faculty members in the three academic areas and staff 
members in a counseling component.  The organizational structure in Developmental 
Studies consisted of a director, Dr. Leroy Ervin, assistant directors, some support staff 
members, counselors, and instructors in the various components of the program.  In each 
program, instructors served on year to year, 9-month contracts.  In addition, an instructor 
from each component was hired to serve as the administrative coordinator for their 
component.  These coordinators served on year to year, 12-month contracts.  
As the Developmental Studies program grew, so did the connection between the 
department and intercollegiate athletics.  The Developmental Studies program was 
intended to help minority students and students with low academic skills in reading, 
English, and mathematics succeed at the University of Georgia.  A result of this initiative 
was that the program became the initial starting point for about 75 percent of the 
University of Georgia’s 400 athletes.  A majority of these athletes were also minority 
students.  In comparison, 5 percent of Georgia Tech’s athletes started in Developmental 
Studies (Georgia Tech is a state rival in college football with the University of Georgia).  
As a statewide comparison, in 1984 about 10 percent of all college students in Georgia 
needed additional coursework in Developmental Studies.93  
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During testimony in the trial when asked about where money from the Athletic 
Association goes, President Davison acknowledged that every sport was supported by 
revenue from the football team and “it even underwrites Developmental Studies since it 
is a major user.”94  When he became the Director of the Developmental Studies program, 
Leroy Ervin said that President Davison opposed the whole concept of a remedial studies 
program at the University of Georgia.  During his testimony, Davison did not confirm 
this statement, but did say that the creation of Special Studies was not his decision and 
stated, “that is part of your segregation plan and we were mandated to have it.”95  
Davison continued to show his lack of support for the program.  Following the trial 
Davison continued to boast the importance of other programs and showed his de-
emphasis of Developmental Studies by stating, “I think what bothers me most is that 
during all of this, we have focused on an important program (Developmental Studies), 
but a program that is relatively small  and that, indeed, does not carry the general use and 
greatness of the University before it.”96 
 Davison was not a supporter of the Developmental Studies program, but he was 
greatly concerned about the revenue generated from college football.  Since a large 
number of Developmental Studies students were athletes, the athletic association put 
money into Developmental Studies so that the athletes in the program could stay eligible.  
The Developmental Studies program wrote a grant proposal in 1980 to the Athletic 
Association for the amount of $38,900.  The Athletic Association gave money to 
Developmental Studies to create a software program that could better track student 
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performance.97  As a stipulation of the grant, the Developmental Studies program 
provided the following specific services to the Athletic Association: 
1. Computer data file of academic activity for all athletes enrolled in Special 
Studies. 
2. Tutorial program involving all athletes presently and previously enrolled in 
Special Studies. 
3. Daily and cumulative weekly computer reports reflecting activity of athletes. 
4. Special academic/tutorial support for athletes enrolled in 100 and 200 level 
courses. 
5. Structured tutorial program in McWhorter Hall for days per week (Monday 
through Thursday). 
6. Special Regents Exam tutorials. 
7. Tutorial for 100 and 200 level courses.98 
 
 By 1985, this grant increased to $200,000 and served to fund a full-scale Developmental 
Studies laboratory that served athletes with the lowest levels of academic ability.99 The 
large percentage of athletes who were involved in the Developmental Studies program 
provided a reason for the Athletic Association to fund the program.   
Promotion and Tenure 
Jan Kemp was an assistant professor at the University of Georgia in the 
Developmental Studies program.  As an assistant professor, Kemp was on a 9-month 
contract.  When she was hired as an assistant professor in 1978 she was also hired as 
coordinator of the English component in Developmental Studies, so the position of 
coordinator changed her contract to a 12-month contract.  Kemp was demoted in 1982 
from the coordinator position and subsequently her contract was non-renewed.  Leroy 
Ervin’s contention was that Jan Kemp’s contract was non-renewed because she failed to 
produce research and showed no interest in it.100  When Jan Kemp began working in 
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Developmental Studies in 1976, no one in Developmental Studies was on a tenure track.  
Faculty members in the department were only eligible to go through the tenure process as 
part of a school or college at the university.  They were considered instructors or 
administrators in their capacity within Developmental Studies.  In 1981, Dr. Ervin 
requested that clarifications be made concerning Developmental Studies becoming a 
promotion unit.101  During this same year, Dr. Ervin went up for tenure within the 
College of Education and was denied due to lack of research.  In 1982, Developmental 
Studies became a promotion unit and Dr. Ervin was granted tenure.  Ervin claimed that 
Kemp had not conducted enough research during her six years of employment at the 
university and that was the reason her contract was not renewed.  Kemp claimed there 
was nothing clear concerning what constituted enough research in Developmental Studies 
and that she deserved more time since the guidelines for Developmental Studies weren’t 
established until 1982.  As a point of reference, Kemp was demoted from her position as 
coordinator of English in February of 1982 and her contract was non-renewed in 
September of 1982.  Kemp’s lawyers argued that Ervin had demoted her before there 
were any official promotion and tenure guidelines for Developmental Studies.  The 
university’s defense tried to show that Kemp should have done more publishable 
research.  Kemp argued that the expectation of research was not clear and that she had to 
teach a full load in addition to finding time for research.  There was a back and forth 
argument over how much research Kemp should have done by the time she was demoted 
and released.  In 1981, the University of Georgia established new promotion and tenure 
guidelines.  At this time, the new guidelines stated that faculty members must 
demonstrate significant accomplishments in two of three areas; research, teaching, and 
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service.  Additionally, the guidelines made exceptions for faculty members who have 
assigned duties that focused on research and service, but not instruction.  This became a 
concern for the faculty members in Developmental Studies because their teaching load 
was much larger and their focus was instruction.102  
In response to these changes, William Diehl, the coordinator of the Reading 
component in Developmental Studies, wrote a letter to the chair of the Promotion and 
Tenure Guidelines committee, Kathryn Blake.  In the letter, Diehl made a plea and 
argument for the committee to modify the guidelines so faculty members in 
Developmental Studies could be considered for tenure because their position was 
expected to focus more on instruction.  Diehl made the following argument in his letter. 
Consequently, faculty members in Special Studies are engaged in a number of 
 research and service activities.  These activities tend to be limited because of 
 constraints imposed by our instructional demands.  Therefore, while we will 
 continue to engage in some research and scholarly activity, we feel that the 
 mission of our Division precludes the attainment of a high level of performance in 
 areas other than instruction.103 
 
On August 19, 1981, Leroy Ervin sent a memo to Virginia Trotter requesting clarification 
of the promotion and tenure status of Developmental Studies program.  In the letter, 
Ervin identified two primary issues:  first, whether the division of Developmental Studies 
was a faculty unit; second, whether the division qualified as a separate promotion unit.  
Ervin stated in a memorandum to Trotter that “this memorandum is intended to identify 
the issues and to make recommendations concerning promotion and tenure policies for 
Developmental Studies faculty members.”104  Jan Kemp was demoted from her 
coordinator position and she was sent a letter of non-renewal on September 2, 1982.  In 
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the letter, Ervin stated the following as some of the reasons for her contract to be non-
renewed. 
1. Since the beginning of Dr. Kemp’s full-time employment (Sept., 1978), she 
has not published any scholarly works. 
2. Since Sept., 1978, she has not participated in national or regional professional 
associations. 
3. Since Sept., 1978, she has not presented any papers at national or regional 
meetings of professional organizations.105 
 
Kemp’s argument was that she had no reason to believe that she should be making 
significant progress toward scholarly research because no official guidelines were set for 
Developmental Studies.  Her lawyers argued that based on Diehl’s letter in May of 1981, 
less than a year before she was demoted, it was clear that there were no firm guidelines.  
They then argued that Ervin’s memo to Trotter confirmed that guidelines and 
expectations were not established for Developmental Studies.  However, Ervin stated that 
Kemp should have been making progress in the research area since she was hired in 1978.  
 Jan Kemp’s research consisted of putting together a textbook for teaching English 
to students in Developmental Studies.  Ruth Sabol, who served as the coordinator of 
English following Jan Kemp, did not disagree with Ervin’s argument that Kemp had not 
produced a significant amount of scholarly research.  However, Sabol’s argument was 
that Kemp had produced research that was the equivalent of other professors in 
Developmental Studies, yet they had not been questioned to the same degree as Kemp.106  
On September 2, 1985, Sabol sent a letter to her attorney asking that a memorandum she 
wrote concerning issues in the Kemp case.  Sabol’s memo was an indictment of Ervin 
and a defense of Jan Kemp’s research.  In response to Ervin’s charge that Jan Kemp’s 
evidence of publication was not research, Sabol made the following argument: 
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 In Dr. Sabol’s view, Ervin is correct.  However, Dr. Sherrie Nist, Reading chair 
 was recently promoted to Acting Associate Director, has just completed a book 
 which is being published by a major publishing house.  Dr. Nist’s book, which Dr. 
 Sabol assumes Dr. Ervin is acknowledging as a publication acceptable in Dr. 
 Nist’s list of publications that will be submitted for Dr. Nist’s promotion and 
 tenure, is a collection of readings taken from other sources and explanations and 
 exercises accompany those readings.  If Dr. Kemp’s exercise books, Usage Part 
 I and Usage Part II are not acceptable to count toward Dr. Kemp’s promotion and 
 tenure, why does Dr. Nist’s book, which is essentially the same kind of 
 publication, count toward her promotion and tenure (if indeed, it does)?107 
 
Preferential Admissions of Athletes 
An analysis of the Developmental Studies audit performed by the Board of 
Regents provided in-depth information concerning the admissions and exiting of athletes 
in the Developmental Studies program at the University of Georgia.  Ultimately, Dr. 
Ervin had full control over admissions and exiting decisions regarding the students in the 
program.  The program had around 300 participating students with 10 to 20 percent (30 to 
60) of them being athletes at the university.  Once students started in Developmental 
Studies they had four quarters to complete the necessary courses to exit the program.  If 
they were unable to complete the necessary courses with a grade of C or better, they were 
dismissed from the university.  Students could appeal the dismissal and request additional 
quarters to complete their courses or if their grades were not high enough.  In the end, Dr. 
Ervin made the decisions on these cases.  Most appeals of dismissals were submitted by 
athletes and in most cases, these appeals were upheld.108  The admission and exiting of 
students from Developmental Studies proved to be an important part of the Jan Kemp 
trial and a point of controversy between the faculty in Developmental Studies, the 
Athletic Department, and the academic administration.   
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 In many cases, athletes were admitted with combined Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT) scores as low as 430 and high school Grade Point Averages (GPA) as low as 1.31.  
(Not all athletes failed to meet the standard requirements for admission to UGA)  In a 
span from 1981-1984, 87 athletes were admitted who fell below the standards for regular 
acceptance to the university and needed to be admitted to the Developmental Studies 
program.  However, 83 out of 87 or 95% of the athletes that were admitted to 
Developmental Studies did not meet the standard requirements for admission to the 
Developmental Studies program (SAT-650 and GPA- 2.0).109  These athletes went 
through three separate processes to gain admission to the university.   
 Most students applying to the University of Georgia during this time period 
needed a score of 900 on the SAT and a high school GPA of 3.0.  If a student did not 
meet these standards they were either denied admission to the university or denied 
regular admission and referred to Developmental Studies for potential admission.  At this 
point in the process, athletes who did not meet the standard criteria for admissions were 
automatically referred to Developmental Studies.110  It is important to note that the 
NCAA considered acceptance into a developmental studies program the same as being 
admitted to the university for the purposes of participating in intercollegiate athletics.  
Additionally, taking classes in developmental studies met the NCAA rules where students 
should be making progress toward a degree.   
 The Developmental Studies program had an admissions and dismissal committee 
that reviewed all applications referred to them for admission to the program.  After 
students were referred to Developmental Studies, they were sent letters offering them an 
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opportunity to be considered for admission into the program.  Students could then apply 
to the Developmental Studies program.  Students receiving a referral then took a basic 
skills examination to measure their English, Mathematics, and Reading skills.  The 
committee, made up of faculty members and staff members within the Developmental 
Studies program, reviewed all applicants in the pool.  The program had an initial cutoff 
for admission of a combined SAT score of 650 and high school GPA of 2.0.  However, 
the NCAA only required athletes to have a 2.0 GPA upon graduation from high school to 
be eligible for participation in intercollegiate athletics.  After admitting students meeting 
the cutoff score, the committee reviewed appeals and any other special circumstances 
using a basic skills examination and other factors in their consideration.  Any students 
left were sent rejection letters.   
At this point in the process, a student could appeal the decision of the committee 
to the Vice President for Academic Affairs, Virginia Trotter.  Trotter could then grant the 
appeal and accept the student into the Developmental Studies program.  To give an 
example, for Fall Quarter 1982, 51 students were administratively admitted after initially 
failing to meet the standards for admission into the Developmental Studies program.  
Twenty-five of these students were athletes.  In one case a student with a 1.31 high 
school GPA and a 480 on the SAT was initially rejected, but then accepted by the 
committee.111  Ervin created a contradiction according to Kemp’s lawyers in relation to 
allowing athletes with low SAT and GPA scores to attend.  Ervin co-authored an article 
in the Journal of College Student Personnel in March 1985, less than one year before the 
trial but after Kemp filed her lawsuit.  In the article, he used current athletes in the 
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Developmental Studies program as test subjects.  In the discussion section of the article, 
Ervin argued 
What action, then, is in the best interest of the student athlete who is academically 
 deficient?  A modification of Rule 48 that would prohibit the admission of 
 students who fail to meet the stated criteria on aptitude tests and high school 
 performance would prevent the continued exploitation of these individuals.112    
 
Ervin supported admitting student athletes in his position and at the same time argued in 
an article published in a national journal that they were being exploited.  During the 
Board of Regents Developmental Studies Audit following the trial, Ervin and Trotter 
were interviewed together.  During the interview, they were asked about the pressure they 
felt from President Davison and the Athletic Association to admit extremely weak 
students.  The following exchange between the interviewer, Ray Cleere, Trotter, and 
Ervin highlights the pressure that Trotter and Ervin felt to admit low academic students to 
the point that it was considered automatic. 
 Cleere:  All right.  Let’s talk about the athletic department- Dick Copas. . . 
 Ervin:  Copas would say, Well, you know, Vince is gonna get his way, so, you 
 know, I. . . he’s gonna send me to Dr. Trotter, and if Dr. Trotter says no, then he’s 
 going to go to the President, and he’s gonna get what he wants from the President. 
 Cleere:  All right. Were there examples. . . and I’m not interested in the names at 
 this moment – were there examples where Copas could not get you to do 
 something with a student, could not get Trotter to do something with a student, 
 and the next thing you know, you’re having a meeting with the President.  Did 
 that ever occur? 
 Ervin:  Well, let me put it this way. 
 Trotter:  Not overtly. 
 Cleere:  All right.  Okay. 
 Ervin:  I think that if Dick has come to me and then he’s gone to Dr. Trotter. . .  
 Trotter:  Many, many times. . .  
 Ervin:  Many times. . . because- I mean, my. . . 
 Cleere:  Concerning the admission or exiting of students. . . excuse me. 
 Trotter:  It’s more the uh. . . I’ve only been involved in terms of the exiting. 
 Cleere:  Oh, in terms of exiting. . .  
 Trotter:  Uh-hum. 
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 Cleere:  Okay. 
 Erving:  The admissions was pretty much automatic.113 
   
Ervin described a specific instance where he felt he had no choice in admitting an athlete.     
There was one woman that we had no choice- well, she was an athlete, but she 
was a non-revenue producing athlete.  But the point is, is that she was going to be 
taken- that was made clear.  She was a [relative] of one of the most prominent 
athletes.114 
 
Ervin and Trotter both felt the President did not support their concerns about the 
admission of athletes.  The two academic administrators responsible for admitting these 
athletes were against it and said they felt pressure from the President to allow these 
students to be admitted.  
 In his testimony during the trial, President Davison addressed why the university 
chose to support admitting students who only had a 2.0 GPA.  Even though he was 
outwardly touting his role in the increasing of academic standards, Davison defended 
why UGA chose not to take its own stand by stating,  
What we call came to a common standard that is known as the standard that we 
have today and that standard was that the only requirement for participation in 
eligibility in intercollegiate athletics was a 2.0 high school GPA.  We all 
embraced that standard even though we knew there was some risk at the time and 
indeed that has proved to be there.  That being the way the 2.0 came about, it was 
to insure a level field of competition.115 
 
 In response to how the university could admit students at such a low academic level, 
President Davison’s response was the university just accepts the problem.   
 We treat it differently because it is different and we have treated it different as a 
 society.  We have given it a large—we have given it a position publicly that we 
 simply don’t give to anything else that a youngster does that age and, in fact we 
 had found that in those two sports [football and basketball] particularly there has 
 been absolutely no requirement for performance in the high schools.  The 
                                                 
113
 V. Trotter & L. Ervin, interview by Ray Cleere, for BOR audit of Developmental Studies, March 5, 
 1986, p. 21-23. 
114
 L. Ervin, interview by Ray Cleere, for BOR audit of Developmental Studies, March 5, 1986,  13-14. 
115
 Kemp v. Ervin, 651 F. Supp. 495 (US District: 1986), Fred Davison Testimony, 3937. 
67 
 
 question that should be asked in this sense is how does a student get out of an 
 accredited high school with a 2.0 HSGPA unable to read.  All the university does 
 is accept the problem, we don’t create it, and we simply try to do the best we can 
 with it.116 
   
 Davison was always open and unapologetic about the fact that athletes and 
specifically football and basketball players were given preferential treatment beyond that 
of the regular student and even athletes from non-revenue producing sports.  He focused 
on the high schools.  He always defended his stance on lowering standards by stating that 
every university with revenue-producing football was like the University of Georgia.  
“That existing pool is very narrow in football and basketball and the pressure against that 
pool is national, it’s not just the University of Georgia, it’s not just Michigan, it’s not just 
Michigan State and it’s relatively similar.”117 
Davison also said that athletes going into revenue-producing sports such as 
football and basketball were more academically deficient than students in non-revenue 
producing sports.118  In an interview with Henry, he agreed that football and basketball 
were treated differently.  He also identified a race and class component that evolved as a 
theme during this analysis.  In describing the recruitment of athletes into revenue-
producing sports, Henry said, “You don’t go to the ghetto to find a gymnast.”119   
In response to Davison’s answer concerning why they lowered admissions 
standards for athletes in revenue producing sports, Hue Henry asked the following 
question, 
Well, Dr. Davison, by perpetuating that system, by admitting them with lower 
admission standards and so forth, aren’t we saying to the young kids in high 
schools as an educator, run fast, bounce the ball, throw it a long way, push it 
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through the hoop, don’t worry about your books, the University of Georgia will 
let you in, lower admission standards, you are perpetuating the system, aren’t 
you?120 
 
Davison’s response to this was that the University of Georgia was not perpetuating the 
system because he was involved in putting together Proposition 48.  As these practices 
continued on campus, President Davison was promoting UGA as a leader in athletic 
reform through his involvement with decisions on national standards.  President Davison 
was actively involved in the creation of Proposition 48 which increased admissions 
standards for athletes.  During the same time as the Jan Kemp trial, the NCAA was 
putting Proposition 48 into action.  Proposition 48 stated that athletes must have a 2.0 
high school GPA and a combined 700 score on the SAT in order to be eligible to 
participate in intercollegiate athletics.  Prior to 1984, athletes were only required to have 
a 2.0 high school GPA to participate in intercollegiate athletics like football.  Davison felt 
this new rule would make a difference in academic reform of athletics.  In contrast, Leroy 
Ervin co-wrote an article entitled, “The Right Direction, but Short of the Mark.”  In the 
article Ervin and his co-authors argued that an institution’s admission standards should 
apply to all incoming freshmen.121  Though these standards were still far below the 
regular admission standard for UGA, Davison believed this was great progress and that 
he was a leader in this movement.  However, his involvement in trying to raise standards 
did not change his view of preferential treatment of athletes at the university level.   
While the university was pursuing this new level of academic standards for 
athletes, he felt that it should not “unilaterally disarm”122 its athletic program.  In the end, 
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Davison was very open about the fact that lower admission standards for football players 
were in place because they could produce revenue.  He saw that football players had a 
utilitarian benefit to the university and even if they never made progress toward 
graduation, the mere fact of being exposed to the university and learning to read and 
write did them no harm.  This statement is evidenced in the following exchange during 
Davison’s testimony during the trial: 
Hue Henry:  Now, that is a curious phrase you just used, unilateral disarmament.  
 Where did you hear that? 
Fred Davison:  I have been using it for five years.  I have said it 10,000 times to 
 10,000 audiences. 
Henry:  You are going around the state talking about athletics in military terms? 
Davison:  Sure, it’s something— 
Henry:  We won’t have the graduates that we need? 
Davison:  No, it’s simply that one institution in our community can’t drop out and 
 survive.  What we want is a level of play.  That is what the NCAA is basically for, 
 what is—what all the rules were set up for, the number the of scholarships was 
 simply to equalize competitive position and that’s what we are for.  We would 
 like to see it equalized nationally.  If we can’t, we’ll equalize it in a small group.  
 By the way, we have been successful.  Proposition 48, even though indexed, goes 
 into effect this year. 
Henry:  Mr. Davison, isn’t it a fact that these relaxed admissions standards are in 
 place because you want kids over there that can produce revenue? 
Davison:  In part.123 
 
Hale Almand, the attorney representing the University’s interest made the 
following statement in his opening statement of the trial.  “We may not be able to make a 
university student out of him, but if we can teach him to read and write, maybe he can 
work at the post office rather than a garbage man when he is finished with his athletic 
career.”124 
In an opinion editorial in the UGA student newspaper, The Red and Black, Alex 
Johnson, a graduate from UGA in 1984, wrote in response to an article by Davison where 
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he stated that athletics had become too professionalized in high schools and that forced 
the universities to be more professionalized and lower standards. 
Very simply, don’t admit students who can’t do the work.  But he won’t do that, 
of course.  There’s too much money at stake.  TV money dictates lowered 
standards.  That’s a fact of collegiate administrative life.  And that, of course, very 
clearly lays the blame for illiterate student-athletes on the greed of athletic 
departments and university fund-raisers.125 
 
Davison justified the admission of athletes with below standard admission scores by 
arguing that the university just accepted a problem created by high schools.  He argued 
that the university needed these athletes to maintain a competitive advantage and that 
even if they didn’t graduate, if they were exposed to some college, they would be better 
off and the university will have done no harm.  Once the athlete’s were admitted, Trotter 
and Ervin both said they felt and obligation to help these students.126  The exiting of these 
low performing athletes became the next phase of Kemp’s concerns.   
Administrative Exiting of Athletes 
Kemp’s disagreement with Ervin and Trotter over the exiting of nine scholarship 
athletes at the end of Fall Quarter, 1981 triggered the demotion and firing of Jan Kemp.  
In this particular situation, there were ten students who came to the end of the fall quarter 
in 1981 without having passed the necessary English course with a grade of C or better.  
The students received D’s in the course.  Fall Quarter 1981 also marked the end of their 
fourth quarter in the program.127  According to UGA policy at the time, students needed 
to complete their necessary course work in Developmental Studies within four quarters of 
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admission to the program in order to exit and transfer into one of the regular schools or 
colleges within the university.128   
The following is taken from the letter written to Dr. Trotter and Dr. Ervin about 
the faculty’s concerns over the exiting of students that did not pass their classes with the 
required C average: 
The ruling to which we object is the decision to exit fourth quarter scholarship 
 football players in spite of their having earned D’s rather than the C’s as required 
 by Developmental Studies policy for fourth quarter exit eligibility.  Since the 
 program’s inception, fourth quarter students have rather consistently been 
 required to earn the C to exit; in fact, even this quarter, the decision was not 
 applied to all students who failed to make C’s.  Another student who likewise 
 earned a D in the fourth quarter was dismissed.  Based on this history, it seems 
 clear that the exit policy has been overruled this quarter only because scholarship 
 athletes failed to make the necessary grades and that, indeed, it was applied only 
 to them.129 
  
At the end of Fall Quarter 1981, nine of the ten students in this situation were exited from 
the program into the regular curriculum by administrative override by Ervin and Trotter.  
An override meant that despite students not being recommended for exit by the faculty 
members and not passing courses with the necessary C average, they were allowed to exit 
the program by decision of Ervin or Trotter.  All nine of the students were athletes.  The 
one student who was not exited was not an athlete.   
 In this particular situation, Kemp protested the exiting of these athletes and 
brought the concern up in the admissions and dismissal committee meetings with other 
faculty members.  Other faculty members stated their concerns about the students being 
exited and Kemp suggested that they write a letter of protest.  At that time, Dr Ervin 
stated that Virginia Trotter, Vice President for Academic Affairs, was involved in the 
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decision so they should direct the letter to her.  There was debate within the committee 
over what the letter should say and about their concerns.   
 Dr Ervin arranged for the faculty to meet with Dr. Trotter.  The meeting happened, 
but without Jan Kemp;  she had to be at a doctor’s appointment because she was pregnant 
at the time.  Unbeknownst to Ervin, Trotter, and the other administrators present, a 
faculty member named Theresa Timmons secretly taped the meeting.  During the meeting, 
faculty members in Developmental Studies discussed their frustrations and difficulties in 
working with athletes.  They were trying to teach athletes who were reading on a third or 
fourth grade level.  One faculty member commented, 
 I taught the six, uh, that are really in question this quarter and while they did 
 make some progress we’re talking looking very hard for it.  And every theme I 
 gave back was an F, occasionally an F+ because I, I felt demoralized.  They 
 would look at them, they would come in excited, waiting for their grades, F and 
 finally they’d look at you and say, ‘Am I doing any better?’  And I would say, 
 ‘Well, yes, but look where you started.’  So it’s this constant reassessment of their 
 abilities, and they’re constantly being put down and the easy thing would be to 
 give them a D or even an occasional C- and say, ‘You’ve come so far from 
 misspelling every word on this paper to only misspelling every third word.  This 
 is real progress.’  But we’re putting F’s on them so in a social sense, they’re 
 demoralized by it.130  
 
Hue Henry felt that this tape was one of the most important pieces of evidence from the 
trial.  In an interview, he commented on its importance. 
 Well, I think probably the most explosive evidence, and there was a lot.  For 
 instance, a kid getting a grade for making a touchdown.  I think beyond that, I 
 think what was most significant and explosive to the jury was the tapes.  The 
 Theresa Timmons tapes.  They were talking about these athletes like they were 
 manufacturing products and they were revenue producing.  What had happened 
 was the faculty were in a uproar so Ervin and some people from the athletic 
 association.  I think Dick Copas was there.  They came to kind of mollify the 
 faculty in that meeting.  Leroy Ervin was fairly candid about why this situation 
 was occurring.  In the course of that conversation he was just saying things that it 
 was obvious that revenue production was more important than academics.  That’s 
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 pretty outrageous and to admit it right there on tape during the hearing.  There 
 saying yes, we knew they couldn’t graduate, but they are special students that 
 have revenue producing skills that this university needs.  So the faculty are saying 
 to them that “so you are saying that this is a fraud, basically.”  He was trying to be 
 candid to calm them down, but Theresa Timmons had a tape recorder.131   
 
 The conversation in this meeting reached the point of discussing the possibility of 
creating a literacy component that would be a “Pre-Developmental Studies” program 
where these students could get basic reading and writing and then could move into 
Developmental Studies where they took classes to prepare them for the regular college 
curriculum. 132  Dr. Ervin proposed that Developmental Studies create an adult literacy 
program in response to helping these athletes work their way up from their current third-
grade level of reading to a level that was comparable to the work being done in 
Developmental Studies.133  Dr. Trotter’s response was the following, 
I don’t even know whether it’s possible for us to do that or not.  I think we can 
certainly put them in a class by themselves if they seem to be having problems or 
when they don’t make as much progress as other students so you don’t hold other 
students back.134 
 
 Some athletes that were exited from Developmental Studies during fall quarter of 
1981 fell into the category of the student described here.  In reading the discussion at the 
faculty meeting that was taped by Theresa Timmons, it is evident that faculty concerns 
were not isolated to the exiting of these nine athletes.  For example, one faculty member 
commented in the meeting, “my concern is we don’t seem to see any changes on the part 
of the recruiting coaches to recruit more students who are competent and recruit fewer 
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students who are deficient.”135  Another faculty member argued about the difficulty in 
getting students to progress to the level of a college student.  “If our criteria is to make 
them into college students, that’s the criteria we’re judging them by, that’s the criteria 
we’re grading them by.  We are constantly putting them in a bad light.  Because they 
can’t do that no matter what.”136  The exiting of students was very difficult for faculty 
members because they worked so hard with the athletes, but they knew they weren’t 
prepared for college work.  Then, when athletes were exited out of Developmental 
Studies without their recommendation it caused faculty members to become upset, with 
Jan Kemp being the most vocal member of the faculty.   
 As a result of the Jan Kemp trial, the Board of Regents performed an audit of the 
Developmental Studies program.  The Board took a close look at the exiting of students 
and isolated athletes as a variable in that investigation.  The audit looked at students in 
the program from 1981 to 1984.  Some policies changed slightly from year to year, so the 
auditors looked at each year individually.  Fall Quarter of 1981 is the quarter that 
included the controversial exiting of nine athletes that were highlighted in trial.  
According to the policies in place during Fall Quarter 1981, students in Developmental 
Studies were required to meet standards at the course, component, and program level.137  
For example, in the English component, students needed to pass a class and their final 
examination with a grade of B or better in the first two quarters and a C or better in the 
third and fourth quarter.  Students then needed to take the classes in a prescribed 
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sequence based on admissions placement and lastly needed to score at least a 64 on the 
Basic Skills Examination.  If students failed a class with an F they were required to retake 
the class.  To then exit from the Developmental Studies program, the student needed to 
meet similar expectations in the Mathematics and Reading components if they were 
placed in those components.138  
 If a student was unable to exit Developmental Studies according to the policies in 
place, there were other ways a student could exit the program.  A student could receive an 
administrative exit based on the recommendation of an instructor.  In some cases, exits 
were handled by Dr. Ervin or Dr. Trotter.  For example, Jan Kemp’s lawyers challenged 
Dr. Trotter on the stand concerning her decision to allow a member of the football team 
to receive a fifth quarter to try and pass composition.139  Additionally, she directed the 
department to create a one-person class for this student.  Her letter was written on March 
23, 1983 and stated the following, 
After careful examination of [this football player’s] academic history, including 
faculty verbal reports, I am directing you to exit him from Developmental Studies 
effective Spring quarter.  I am aware, however, that [he] still has some need for 
additional work to further improve his composition skills, therefore, I am also 
directing that an individualized program in composition be developed Spring 
quarter tailored to meet [this football player’s] needs.140 
 
In the Fall Quarter of 1981, the department used a standard deviation to make 
decisions on exits using the Basic Skills Examination, so a student could be considered 
for administrative exit if he scored five points below the benchmark score of 64.  If a 
student was unable to exit based on these situations, he could also appeal the decision.  
The nine athletes that were administratively exited in 1981 were students that failed 
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English, had reached their limit of four quarters, and had not scored above the benchmark 
score on the Basic Skills Examination.  Additionally, they did not have the 
recommendation of the instructors to exit the program.  In her testimony at the trial, Dr. 
Trotter continued to state that she did not recall inquiring about the one non-athlete that 
was not exited.  She did remember many of the athletes and she stated that the trial and 
the subsequent audit of Developmental Studies uncovered additional forms of preferential 
treatment designed to assist athletes in maintaining eligibility and to help them exit 
Developmental Studies.141   
 Faculty members who taught athletes in Developmental Studies realized that 
many of these students were so far behind in the curriculum that they might not pass any 
of the Developmental Studies courses.  In response to this situation, the Developmental 
Studies program and the Athletic Department created additional forms of preferential 
treatment to assist these athletes.  Faculty members taught classes with only one-student 
on the roster and they were generally athletes.  Developmental Studies created a 
laboratory that allowed athletes at extremely low levels of academic proficiency to take 
classes with one-on-one tutoring or individualized instruction.  In other cases, faculty 
members spent additional evening hours tutoring students to help them catch up.  Jan 
Kemp mentioned inviting students to her house to tutor them or going to the athletic 
dormitories to tutor students.142  Coaches and academic advisors in the athletic 
department advised athletes to take certain courses that would help them maintain 
eligibility even if it was found those classes did not help them progress toward graduation.  
The trial and the subsequent Board of Regent’s audit found that these activities were the 
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norm in Developmental Studies.  Additionally, it was found these activities were 
supported and even expected by upper level administrators.  During the trial, student 
reporters for The Red and Black student newspaper told stories such as the following to 
show the impact the system had on the athletes. 
 A 20-year-old sophomore at the University of Georgia collapses at his desk in his 
 McWhorter Hall room, the dormitory that houses scholarship athletes.  It is just a 
 little past seven in the evening, and the final traces of the impressive southern 
 sunset can still be seen from the window of the exhausted athlete’s room.  
 Although it is still early, the student has found his literature for English 102 
 impossible to absorb.  The challenging schedule has left the athlete with little 
 energy to devote to studying and, after a brief period of resistance, he finally falls 
 asleep.  Another day has passed with yet another assignment undone.143 
  
Other Preferential Treatment of Athletes 
During the Board of Regents Audit of Developmental Studies programs in the 
State of Georgia, Ray Cleere conducted interviews with key personnel at the University 
of Georgia.  Cleere was the lead auditor for the Board of Regents and was charged with 
investigating Developmental Studies programs around the state of Georgia.  From the 
interviews, Cleere argued that the Developmental Studies program had created a 
laboratory that “operated as a distinct administrative unit” within Developmental Studies.  
The laboratory was designed to offer specific one-on-one tutoring and instruction to 
students who came to the university at the lowest level of academic proficiency.  The 
entire laboratory was funded by a $200,000 grant from the Athletic Association.  
Additionally, the primary users of the laboratory were athletes.144  Students who used the 
laboratory were able to take their necessary requirements through the laboratory instead 
of taking classes through the regular Developmental Studies curriculum.  Cleere stated 
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that “this is an unfortunate practice which has the potential to subvert standards 
established for exiting Developmental Studies.”145  Cleere’s argument was that the 
laboratory was essentially funded by the Athletic Department through a grant, was 
primarily used by athletes, and the instructors and tutors with control of the curriculum 
were paid for through the grant and thus by the Athletic Department. 
Throughout the interviews, Cleere also found evidence that athletes were 
receiving their academic advising through the coaches and academic advisors in the 
Athletic Department.  Dick Copas, who was an Athletics Counselor, told Cleere that the 
work they did was a supplement to the academic advising done in the academic 
colleges.146  After a review of the academic transcripts of athletes, Cleere found that they 
were taking courses designed to help maintain eligibility for athletics and not to maintain 
progress towards graduation.  When Cleere interviewed Curt Fludd, an academic 
counselor for athletes, Fludd admitted that there was a process for “assisting” athletes 
with weaker academic proficiency.   
No primary academic advising was done through the Athletic Department.  
However, when presented with selected transcripts of academically weak athletes, 
he admitted and described a process by which students were often assisted in 
selecting those courses that would improve their academic standing and indirectly 
maintain their athletic eligibility.147 
 
  In analyzing the interview of Dr. Marty McFadden, an academic advisor in the program, 
Cleere argued that “her testimony represented a departure from Mr. Fludd’s in that she 
clearly described a practice by which certain students were advised exclusively by the 
Athletic Department without the involvement of assigned academic advisors.”148  
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McFadden also reviewed the transcripts of athletes for Cleere and identified classes that 
were considered easier for athletes.  Many of these courses were upper-level courses in 
the College of Education and by letting athletes take these courses, the University was in 
violation of its accreditation.  The following is a list of courses tagged by athletic 
department advisors as easy courses.  In some cases, athletes still in Developmental 
Studies took these courses before exiting to the regular curriculum. 
EIA 332- Industrial Arts and Handicrafts 
ENT 201- Insects and Man 
EPY 401- Psychology of Early Childhood 
EPY 304- Learning and Motivation 
EBE 401- Business Communication 
EBE 507- Office Management 
SED 544- Safety in Sports & Recreation 
EPH 528- Sociology of Education 
EAV 401- Basic Instructional Media Competencies 
 ECP 399- Career Development for Life Planning 
 HED 370- Community Health Organizations 
 CFD 395- Introduction to Child Development149 
 
In Cleere’s view, the practice of allowing these students to take these classes was in clear 
violation of the Board of Regents policy.  However, he stated that “even more 
significantly, it represents a deviation from standard practice, a compromise of the natural 
sequence of the Core Curriculum, and a clear breach of the academic integrity of the 
institution.”150 
The Events that Led Kemp to Sue 
On February 3, 1982, Jan Kemp was removed from her position as English 
coordinator in the Developmental Studies program.151  After bouts with depression, the 
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birth of her first child, and two attempted suicides, Jan Kemp officially filed her lawsuit 
in the Superior Court of Clarke County in Athens, GA on May 26, 1982.  She was filing 
suit against Leroy Ervin, her former supervisor and Director of Developmental Studies at 
the University of Georgia.    The charges in her complaint were the following, 
1. On or about March 1982, Ervin wrote and/or caused to be written certain 
libelous letters. 
2. On or about February 1982, and continuing thereafter, Ervin did willfully 
interfere with Kemp’s contract of employment with the Board of Regents of 
the University System of Georgia 
3. On or about March, 1981, and continuing thereafter Ervin did intentionally 
inflict mental and emotional distress upon Kemp. 
4. At all times, Ervin acted willfully, wantonly, recklessly and maliciously and in 
bad faith.152 
 
After a preliminary hearing and depositions, Kemp additionally filed suit against Dr. 
Virginia Trotter, Vice-President for Academic Affairs and the Board of Regents as 
defendants in the lawsuit.  The trial was moved from Superior Court in Clarke County, 
Athens, GA to United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia Atlanta 
Division in Atlanta, GA.  
 The burden of proof for Jan Kemp’s lawyers was to prove that Kemp spoke out in 
faculty meetings and to her supervisors about issues of great public concern.  They 
needed the jury to believe that her demotion and firing were violations of the First 
Amendment in the United States Constitution that protects freedom of speech.153  In 
essence, the lawyers needed the jury to believe that preferential treatment of athletes and 
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corrupt practices in Developmental Studies related to this treatment were of great public 
concern. 
According to Kemp, Developmental Studies was the focus of academic corruption.  
In an interview for Atlanta Magazine, Kemp stated that “she became aware, one by one, 
of departmental irregularities that flew in the face of university standards.”154   
Kemp challenged her supervisor Leroy Ervin and the system during her time in 
Developmental Studies.  Kemp’s view was that standards should not be lowered 
regardless of type of student.  For example, on June 30, 1978, Kemp wrote a letter to 
Leroy Ervin challenging a move to lower the necessary grade to exit the English 
component of Developmental Studies from a B to a C.  Kemp’s argument was that if a 
student got a C in Developmental Studies, they were likely to get a D in regular English 
101.  Kemp’s argument was supported by a professor in the English Department.  In the 
letter, Kemp states, “As Dr. Breme pointed out in an earlier staff meeting, English 101 
failures are already extremely high for our students.  Why assure more failures by 
allowing an even higher number of premature exits.”155   
The next year, Kemp pressed Ervin again concerning being lenient towards 
Developmental Studies students.  In a memorandum written on December 18, 1979, 
Kemp argued that the dismissal policy in Developmental Studies was too lenient.  At the 
time, if students received three grades of F in Developmental Studies or two grades of F 
in the same Developmental Studies course, they were dismissed from the university.  
Kemp argued that students should be dismissed after two F’s at any point in time during 
their experience in Developmental Studies.  Kemp stated that “it is not the nature of the 
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university that a student who can perform so poorly in such a supportive environment as 
ours can survive and do well in the more competitive, less supportive world of regular 
course work.”156  Ervin responded two days later on December 20, 1979 through a 
memorandum.  In his response, Ervin disagreed with Kemp about the leniency of the 
dismissal policy having a correlation to future success.  Ervin stated that “the dismissal 
policy has little or no relationship as to how effective an educator is with students in a 
teaching-learning situation.”157   
 On January 18, 1982, two weeks before her demotion, Kemp challenged the pass 
and fail eligibility of athletes in an admissions committee meeting.  Kemp asked, “how 
can we maintain our integrity when a student has not exited but is transferred from the 
program.”158  At the same meeting, Dr. Ervin responded to Kemp’s arguments by stating 
that the department needed to form a policy so that exceptions to the exit policy could 
only be made by Dr. Trotter, the Vice-President for Academic Affairs.  From this 
meeting, Kemp agreed to draft a letter to Dr. Trotter on behalf of the faculty stating their 
concerns about the exiting of student athletes.159  The subsequent meetings of the 
admissions committee involved the committee discussing the letter that Kemp wrote and 
the issues concerning the exiting of athletes.  The committee decided to send the letter to 
Dr. Ervin and a copy to Dr. Trotter.   
 The letter was given to Dr. Ervin, but it was never sent to Dr. Trotter because 
Kemp was demoted before it could be sent to Dr. Trotter.  During her testimony, Kemp 
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speculated that the letter was never sent to Trotter out of fear.  “No it was never sent, 
because I was demoted after that I think the other members felt that it was a result of that 
and they didn’t want retaliation, too.”160  In later testimony Kemp argued that if the 
university continued to give special treatment to athletes then, “students would get the 
impression that they didn’t have to do the work because they were athletes.”161   
On February 3, 1982, Kemp met with Ervin and at that meeting he demoted her as 
coordinator of the English component.  For the time being, she remained on the faculty as 
an instructor and was no longer a 12-month employee.  Immediately after she was 
demoted, Kemp filed a grievance to appeal the decision and hired a University of Georgia 
law professor, Larry Blount as her attorney.  In her statement of grievance, Kemp argued 
that she was removed from her administrative position due to her “long-standing vocal 
opposition to division practices which, to her mind, were potentially adverse to the 
program and its participants.”162  Some of the practices she spoke of were reversing 
admissions committee decisions, pressuring faculty members to change grades, 
overruling exiting decisions, and special accommodations for athletes.  After the panel 
heard Kemp’s grievance, she was informed that her appeal was denied because there 
were not procedural errors involved in the demotion.  Kemp was unhappy with the 
decision of the panel and moved forward with her lawsuit.   
Kemp felt the problems rested within the administration’s unwillingness to 
change.  In an interview, Kemp commented on her feelings about many of the key people 
in athletics and academics.  When asked in an interview to respond with her thoughts 
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about Vince Dooley, she said, “I don’t know why Vince didn’t want the integrity.  So I 
don’t know why he picked on me.”163  In his autobiography, Vince Dooley commented 
on a meeting with Jan Kemp in response to a fifteen-page letter she sent him with her 
concerns about the athletic department’s involvement in preferential treatment of athletes.  
In the letter, Kemp challenged Dooley on some of the practices in the athletic department.  
In addition, she believed that coaches were encouraging players to write slanderous 
letters about her.  Dooley’s response was 
About 70 percent of she was talking about was baseless.  The other 30 percent of 
 her questions I couldn’t answer but I promised to check them out.  After checking 
 them out, about half of those concerns had no basis either.  But the remaining 15 
 percent of things she raised included some very legitimate problems that needed 
 to be addressed.164 
 
Kemp also felt that upper-level administrators such as Dr. Trotter and President Davison 
were not interested in maintaining academic integrity.   
When asked about her thoughts on the role of Fred Davison, Kemp responded 
with the following statement.  “There was no reason for him to be there.  I am pretty sure 
it was about 16 times that I called him for an appointment and I finally got it.  And that 
was it because there were no reforms. Zilch, zero.”165   
In regard to Leroy Ervin, Kemp stated during the trial that he was not her favorite 
person.  In response to Hale Almand’s challenge to her that it was “sort of a classic 
understatement,” Kemp replied, “not entirely Mr. Almand.  Through nightly prayer I 
have conquered my anger and gained personal strength.”166  During an interview with Jan 
Kemp, when asked about her thoughts on Leroy Ervin, she responded, “I never heard 
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anything that came out of his mouth that would benefit anybody.  And most of the time 
he’s trying to say things to scare people away from him.  And I don’t scare so easy.”167  
While on the stand, Almand questioned Kemp’s motives and argued that she was 
pursuing the lawsuit for monetary gain;  there are a variety of perspectives on why Kemp 
became the key whistleblower. 
For example, the following is the exchange between Kemp and Almand when he 
pressed her on why she was suing Ervin.   
Almand: Now, Dr. Kemp, of course, you are asking this jury to award you 
damages? 
Kemp:  Yes, sir. 
Almand: Monetary damages? 
Kemp: Yes, sir. 
Almand: And you will want to convince them that your cause is just so you will 
get money? 
Kemp:  Yes, sir. 
Almand:  And to that end you will say whatever is necessary to accomplish that 
purpose, won’t you? 
Kemp: No, sir.  Money has never been my primary motivating force.  Had it been, 
I wouldn’t have become a teacher. 
Almand: All right. 
Kemp:  The principles involved are far more important to me than money.   
Almand:  So you would be just as happy if all you got was a dollar? 
Kemp: As long as the university was cleaned up, yes, sir.168 
 
Hue Henry believed that Kemp personified the typical whistleblower.  In a an article for 
Atlanta Magazine in 1991 entitled “Jan of Arc,”  Kemp’s lawyer, Hue Henry, described 
Jan Kemp within the context of whistleblowers. 
I’ve represented a lot of whistleblowers, so I’ve come to know them in my work 
and they are definitely a type.  From my experience, most of us wouldn’t do it.  
These people are different.  More often than not, they are of such strong 
convictions they become abrasive.  It’s not that they’re not likable people.  It’s 
just that First Amendment law is made by people who are gadflies.  So once she’d 
                                                 
167
 Jan Kemp, interview by author, tape recording, Athens, GA, 22 November 2006. 
168
 Kemp v. Ervin, 251 F. Supp. 495, (US District, 1986), Transcript from February 5, 1986,  p. 4194. 
86 
 
decided it was a matter of principle, she was going to defend her position, the 
consequences be damned.169 
 
In a 2006 interview with Henry, he described Kemp as a tragic figure and described the 
entire situation as Shakespearean.  He saw the administrators as having gotten so 
involved that they eventually had to fall and Kemp became consumed by the limelight.  
Henry said there were at least seven or eight other people that could have come forward 
and filed suit and challenged the administration.  However, only Kemp pursued it.  He 
attributes Kemp’s persistence to fitting the bill of a whistleblower. 
But everybody but Jan decided to move on, get on with their life.  She’s really an 
unusual person.  You’ve got nine persons that could be whistle blowers, I’m just 
pickin that number, it was probably 7 or 8.  But one of them does it and the others 
don’t.  What’s the difference?170 
 
The difference between Kemp and the others may be that the others did not want to 
endure the emotional and psychological burdens that Kemp faced as a whistleblower.  
Kemp faced a tremendous amount of pressure from a variety of areas.  A member of the 
athletic department told her that letters were being solicited that made claims that she was 
a prostitute and stripped in class.171  Kemp was pregnant at the time she was demoted and 
faced the thought of having her contract dropped from 12 months to 9 months.  During 
her deposition, she admitted that she was seeing a psychologist to help deal with the 
stress.172  Kemp faced criticism and fought her own depression that she says was a result 
of the events that led up to her demotion and the trial that followed.  In an unpublished 
autobiography, Kemp described in one night where she attempted suicide.  That night she 
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stabbed herself and tried to cut her wrists, but the blade hit bone and never severed a 
major artery.  She wrote,  
Totally unconscious of any pain, I couldn’t help analyzing the events that had led 
me to this point of total despair.  I couldn’t organize the thoughts as they rushed 
through my fatigued mind.  There was the first grade changing incident and then 
the nasty phone call from one of my students.  I winced as I recalled his angry, 
profane words.  There was the illegal exiting of the nine athletes who had not 
earned their passage from remedial courses into the University’s regular 
curriculum.  There was the protest letter I had written over this latter incident that 
had seemed inspired from above.  It had virtually written itself.  But there had 
begun the systematic harassment of colleagues who had supported me- of Annie 
Ritter, of Art Stanley, of Bert Smith.  Tears began to stream down my face.  I 
needed to sob openly but hadn’t the energy.  Thank you for the tears, Lord, I 
prayed.  Bless your holy name.173 
    
In the chapter, she told the story of a second suicide attempt, this time by pills.  She 
described how her second stay at a psychiatric hospital helped her to battle depression 
and realize that she could not escape her situation, but had to fight through it.  At the end 
of the chapter, Kemp told how she met with Pat Nelson to officially write out her 
complaint and file the lawsuit.  Kemp recalled, “I was thrilled that I was able to laugh 
with him, but more thrilled that I was able to reclaim the courage that had filled me when 
I first realized that I had to battle the corruption that pervaded the University of Georgia 
campus.174 
Kemp’s personal struggles were not her only concerns outside the scope of the trial.  
Kemp received hate mail, was taunted by passersby, and went through a difficult divorce.  
Kemp continued to persist despite these external pressures.  During a 2006 interview, 
Kemp told a story of person who recognized her and almost wrecked her car.  When 
asked how she thought the trial had affected students, she responded,  
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Well, it’s interesting, because it was right after the trial and I was driving 
somewhere to get something to eat and this woman tried to wreck me.  She rolled 
the window down and said, you’re the one who is ruining UGA.  I said, well I’ll 
stop tomorrow.  She said, you’re a smart ass.175 
 
She received very few signed letters, but received one in 1989, three years after the 
verdict, from a lawyer.  The letter claimed that Kemp was a “disaffected person,” 
“discordant,” and a “schizoid.”  The letter made the following statement about Kemp: 
So, why don’t you go somewhere where your personality fits in; there are plenty 
of losers to choose from?  I consider you to be a despicable person from you 
record.  Only you know what your game is.  However, you are a pathetic person 
whom I pity.176 
 
Kemp did receive some praise as well.  A number of articles about the case 
written by reporters around the country sent notes with clippings from their paper telling 
Hue Henry what a great job they did with the case.  Kemp gave an example of a positive 
experience in Athens after the trial.  “You know, not long ago I was walking to get to this 
child who was with her mother.  You know who this is, it was Jan Kemp.  She was so 
thrilled that I had done that.”177 
 Kemp’s lawyer, Hue Henry sympathized with her plight and situation.  He 
regarded her as a prototype whistleblower and recognized the difficulties that came with 
being one. 
I think she is just really a tragic figure.  I think the whole episode is 
Shakespearean.  The esteem of power and you get too big involved you fall.  On 
their side.  And then on her side, she got so popular and well known that the 
person to become obscure it is very hard to handle that.  I think she was a tragic 
figure.  She became so well known.  She did the whole thing where she went to 
jail because she had violated her custody order with the divorce.  As I saw all that 
develop.  Maybe because I am a theatre person.  But other people were saying that 
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this was a tragedy of Shakespearean dimension.  Talking about the university and 
so forth and I think she was a character.178 
 
Kemp needed persistence and focus to continue to pursue her lawsuit.  The entire process 
took over three years and at anytime, she could have stopped.  Kemp did determine that 
there are things she wished she had done differently.  The example she gave, spoke 
directly to her daily function as a person: 
The only thing I can say that blessed me was this.  As grueling as it was, if I was 
ever in a situation like that, I would have to make rules for myself.  You have to 
eat.  You have to sleep and you have to care.  And that’s it.  Because others aren’t 
going to care for you unless you let them know.179  
 
At the time, Pat Nelson served as Kemp’s lawyer and associating Hue Henry, they 
decided it was important to make it a federal case upon Henry’s recommendation.  Henry 
stated,   
He came and got me because of the university litigation and plus the case was 
originally in the state court, you remember that, and I had a lot of federal 
experience because of my clerkship and as a public defender.  Pat knew that and 
was bumping into some resistance and called me and asked me what I thought 
should be done and I recommended to get it to Federal court and get it out of state 
court, get it out of Athens.  That’s how I got involved.180   
 
The case was moved to Atlanta and heard by Horace T. Ward.  Ward had a unique 
connection to the University of Georgia.  He was the first African-American to challenge 
racially discriminatory admissions policies at the University of Georgia, in 1950.181  The 
university’s lawyer in the Kemp case, Hale Almand, argued successfully to have the 
Board of Regents removed as a defendant in the case.  However, Ward determined that 
the case should stay in his court and in Atlanta.  This meant that the jury for the case 
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would be pulled from Atlanta and not Athens, GA.  Ward’s decision to keep the case in 
Federal court was for two main reasons.  First, as Ward stated, “A defense of improper 
venue is a personal privilege accorded a defendant.  Being a privilege, it can be insisted 
upon or it may be lost.”182  Second, since the pretrial work and pending motions had gone 
on for two years and they had worked through discussion over the use of student grades 
and information that was protected by the Federal Educational Right to Privacy Act 
(FERPA), Ward determined that “the defendants have not shown that it would be in the 
interest of justice to transfer this case at so late a stage in the proceedings.”183  The 
original trial date had been set for August 12, 1985, but after the Board of Regents was 
determined to no longer be a valid defendant, the trial was set for January, 1986.  The 
trial lasted for five weeks and on February 12, 1986, the jury found Leroy Ervin and 
Virginia Trotter guilty on all counts for knowingly and willfully violating Jan Kemp’s 
rights to free speech.  The jury rendered the following damages in favor of Kemp. 
Compensatory damages of $79,680.95 
Mental distress of $200,000 
Loss of Professional Reputation of $1 
Punitive damages of  $2,300,000184 
 
Responses After the Trial 
 
 The Jan Kemp trial created negative publicity for the university.  Some people 
viewed the trial as a catalyst for uncovering the dark side of college football.  This is 
evident in articles written in local and national publications.  Within the public relations 
and alumni association at the university, people were concerned about the negative 
publicity the trial had created.   
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As an example, on April 24, 1986, the university sponsored a Loyalty Day Rally 
in Atlanta.  The event included concerts, speeches, and free refreshments all in an effort 
to bring supporters of the University of Georgia together to show support for the school 
despite the negative publicity.  Trummie Patrick, the coordinator of the event described 
the event in an article for the UGA Columns magazine:  “This effort is intended to 
demonstrate solidarity and support for the University of Georgia in light of recent 
negative publicity the school has received.”185  The event tried to bring focus to the 
academic and non-athletic prowess of the university.  The organizers of the event 
attempted to promote the university as “an international reputation as a leader in the field 
of biotechnology research and its faculty in plant molecular biology is considered one of 
the best anywhere.”186   
Whether intentional or not, the public message put forward by the university was 
that the institution was bigger than college football and its priorities were truly academic 
in nature.  While this rhetoric was rarely used in mainstream media such as local and 
regional newspapers, it seems evident that effort was made by the institution to assure the 
faculty at the university that the priorities of the institution concerned the academic 
mission and the role of the faculty in its governance. 
The negative public image created by the scandals was also seen through student 
responses in the newspaper.  A student who worked as a tutor spoke about the pressures 
in Developmental Studies.  “I know that exiting (over teacher’s advice) did happen 
although none that I worked with.  There is pressure from over the teacher’s head.  The 
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teacher feels the student should not be exited, and then someone says pass the kid.”187  In 
a letter to the editor, a freshman student questioned the institution’s priorities and the 
priorities of colleges across the country.  “Colleges and universities in the United States 
need to re-evaluate the areas where they spend their scholarship money; especially in the 
area of athletics.  Is it really more important to send a promising athlete to school, or a 
promising student?”188  During the trial, an editorial in the student newspaper read, 
“Clean it up.”  The editorial criticized the university based on the Hale Almand’s 
comments during the trial about athletes.  “The insulting part came when Mr. Almand 
admitted Tuesday that athletes have received preferential treatment in remedial courses.  
He said some athletes come to the university unable to read and write.  “Bring out the 
violins, but don’t expect us to reach for a hanky to wipe away tears with.”189 
Student editorials appeared in the student newspaper throughout the trial.  Tommy 
Sims, former editor of the Red and Black stated in an opinion article, “What we are 
beginning to see now is that there is without a doubt two groups of athletes at Georgia.  
The academic-athlete and the non-academic athlete.  The latter group doesn’t fit in with 
college and college athletics are all about.”190  Student response for the most part was 
outrage.  They formed organizations such as Students Against Campus Corruption.191  
Student opinions were overwhelmingly in favor of cleaning up the athletic scandals.  It 
never happened, but one of the sequences written in a movie script based on the Jan 
Kemp trial included a scene with a student holding a sign that said, “Let the Big Dawg 
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Read!  Thanks Jan Kemp!”192  Jan Kemp never attended a football game again to see 
signs like this, but she did find that many of the students at the university supported her 
cause. 
The Faculty’s Response to the Jan Kemp Trial 
An analysis of the University of Georgia Columns magazine and additional 
newspaper editorials presented evidence of the faculty reaction to the Jan Kemp trial at 
the University of Georgia.  During the months and years following the case, the faculty 
became heavily engaged in redefining the role of faculty members in the governance of 
the university and in particular, athletics.  Support for this movement seemed to come 
from a change in leadership at the presidential level.  
Following the trial, Davison resigned as president of the university.  The Board of 
Regents then announced that Dr. Henry Stanford would become interim president of the 
University of Georgia.  Stanford described the purpose of a university as “a critic, a 
prophet, and a conscience of society.”193  Stanford’s job was to assist in improving the 
public image of the University of Georgia and assessing the current administrative 
structure of the institution.  Stanford claimed he was a “self-appointed evangelist.”194  He 
gave approximately 181 speeches around the state of Georgia in an effort to improve the 
university’s public image.  Stanford highlighted two goals as being prominent in his role 
as interim president.  First, Stanford wanted to “study decision-making on campus, 
particularly the faculty’s role in the process.”195  Second, he planned “to begin a long-
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range planning process to determine where we expect to be in 10 years.”196  Following a 
similar message as put forward by the public relations office about the UGA Loyalty Day, 
Dr. Stanford stated that “it’s time to focus on the achievements of the university, and 
move away from its mistakes, if there are any.”197  Stanford’s statement was very 
strategic in an attempt to appease both sides.  He assumed and recognized that mistakes 
are made, even in a general sense which is a line of rhetoric that played out in the media 
and within the faculty ranks. 
In an effort to ensure mistakes were not made on his watch and probably to 
appease the faculty and critics of the university, Stanford appointed Dr. Boyd McWhorter 
to be an athletic consultant.  McWhorter was a former English professor at the University 
of Georgia and had recently left the post of athletic commissioner for the Southeastern 
Conference.  Stanford’s reasoning for hiring an athletic consultant was to have someone 
serve as the coordinator of all academic activities related to athletes.  In this role, 
McWhorter monitored the admissions process and academic progress of athletes.  
Compliance with the SEC and the NCAA and serving as a liaison between academics and 
athletics were two primary components of McWhorter’s role.  Stanford used the analogy 
of a certified public accountant report to explain McWhorter’s role in the structure.  “He 
will serve as an independent academic auditor, reporting directly to me as an independent 
certified public accountant reports on financial activities directly to the chief executive of 
an organization.”198 Stanford went on to say that hiring McWhorter was intended to make 
sure that administrators were fair and equitable when it came to addressing the needs of 
student athletes in the academic realm.  In his State of the University Address, Stanford 
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used every opportunity to convince the faculty and critics that the University of Georgia 
was more than college football.  Stanford set up an environment in which the faculty and 
administrators would debate over the future of the university.  In his address he described 
the Jan Kemp trial as, 
A Greek drama as I sat in front of my fireplace in Americus, GA.  The chorus 
singing into my mind’s ears about the fate the Gods had willed for the actors, 
seemingly puppets pulled by a string held in the hands of a deus or several dei ex 
machine.  Little did I realize that one of these strings was attached to me.199 
 
Stanford also used the analogy of a laboratory rat to demonstrate the stress the institution 
faced as a result of the Jan Kemp trial.  “Like the laboratory rat, the university was under 
the extreme stress of different experiments and external pressures. These stresses create 
conflict inside the rat’s body and similarly the university faces a conflict within itself as a 
result of these stressors.”200  In a plea to the faculty and the university community, 
Stanford wanted to see the university overcome this stress. 
 Stanford viewed the Jan Kemp trial as an opportunity to re-emphasize the 
academic mission of the institution.  He continued to make his plea to the faculty and 
ensure the academic integrity of the university with the following statement, 
I have wondered how in American education, it has developed that the prestige of 
a professor is in inverse ratio to the number of hours he, or she teaches.  I have an 
axiom that I place alongside this one: Prestige varies directly with the level of 
students he teach.  The higher the level, the more prestige; the lower, the less 
prestige.201 
 
However, Stanford did not offer unconditional support to the faculty.  During the months 
leading up to Stanford becoming the interim president, the faculty formed an ad hoc 
committee within the University Council and completed a study of the governance and 
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operation of the university.  The University Council was then and currently is the faculty 
governance organization for the University of Georgia.  The committee created a report 
with recommendations to Dr. Stanford concerning the governance and operations of the 
university.   In his address, Stanford gave an overall response to the recommendations of 
the ad hoc committee.  Stanford stated, “even though I do not agree with all the 
recommendations for change, I am eager for the report to have the widest possible 
review.”  He continued to say that “reasonable people can disagree and still be respectful 
of contrary notions when they are rooted in sincere conviction.”202  Analyzing the report 
of the ad hoc committee on academic policies and Stanford’s responses to their 
recommendations offers insight into where Stanford fell along the continuum between the 
academic mission and the support of intercollegiate athletics. 
 In January of 1986, the University Council created an ad hoc committee to study 
“the various issues engendered by the Kemp case and to make such recommendations as 
it deems appropriate.  The committee members were tenured members with no 
administrative duties.”203  Thus, the Kemp case was a catalyst for change with the 
University Council and the faculty’s role in the governance of the university.  In the 
committee’s report to the University Council, they stated first that the statues and bylaws 
of the university and the University Council needed to be updated since they had not been 
changed since 1973, a span of 13 years. 
 The ad hoc committee identified problems with the University Council that in its 
opinion excluded the faculty from being prominently involved in the decision making of 
                                                 
202
 Ibid. 
203
 “Report of Ad Hoc Committee of the University Council, UGA Columns, volume 14, num 4,  March, 
 1986, 3-5. 
97 
 
the institution.  The committee formed the following list of problems with the University 
Council and a statement of its concerns. 
1. The number of administrators on the Council; 
2. The climate of decision-making in which the faculty does not feel free to speak 
openly about matters of concern; 
3. The fact that the presiding officer of the Council is the President of the University 
rather than a faculty member without administrative assignment; 
4. The structure and functioning of the Executive Committee (to the University 
Council); 
5. The number of administrators who serve as chairs of key Council committees; 
6. The number of administrators who are on key committees and in some instances 
dominate the committee; 
7. The absence of reference in the Statutes and Bylaws to the faculty’s role with 
regard to the governance of the athletic program and the absence of reference to 
the relationship between the University and the Athletic Association.204 
 
The committee’s concerns raised two major questions, why were administrators allowed 
to have overwhelming control over the governance of the institution, and why was the 
role of the faculty minimal and undefined?  The following statement along with the list of 
problems summarized the focus of the committee. 
 Over the years the University Council has evolved to a point that it has lost the 
 respect and confidence of the faculty as a legitimate format for faculty governance, 
 as the recent poll of faculty opinion concerning the Council clearly indicated.  
 Part of this is due to the problems mentioned above, but part may be due to the 
 method by which items must be screened through the Executive Committee to get 
 on the agenda of a meeting for discussion.  Several members of the Committee 
 who have served on the Executive Committee think this is a major roadblock to 
 effective faculty involvement in the University Council.205 
 
The committee believed that the current structure of the University Council did not allow 
for enough checks and balances, especially in regard to the relationship between the 
university and the athletic association.  For example, the University Council had a 
Committee on Intercollegiate Athletics.  The Chair of this committee was appointed by 
the president who also served as an ex-officio member of the Athletic Association Board.  
                                                 
204
 Ibid.,  3. 
205
 Ibid.,  3. 
98 
 
The faculty members on this committee believed this gave the president too much control 
and did not allow for the faculty to choose their representative in matters pertaining to 
athletics.   
 The committee also produced recommendations related to admissions, 
Developmental Studies, and athletics.  The committee addressed the admission standards 
of athletes, the private status of the athletic association, and some requests for reform.206  
In regard to admissions, the committee believed that “NCAA regulations should play no 
part in the admissions process at the University of Georgia.”207  They continued to 
challenge the decisions of administrators, saying that “by admitting athletes who are not 
capable of coping with the University’s regular academic program, the University has 
done a disservice to the students involved and has compromised its integrity.”208   
 In regard to athletics, the committee had great concerns about the private status of 
the Athletic Association.  It pointed out that since the Athletic Association was a separate 
corporation it did not have the same legal liability as state institutions.  A powerful 
example of this situation was that the Athletic Association was not subject to a state 
audit.209  Since state law did not allow athletic associations to use state funds, they 
became managed more like a business than as part of an academic enterprise.  To the 
committee, this created a problem because, 
 Athletic considerations can therefore be kept separate from academic 
 considerations.  Nevertheless, despite the fiscal convenience of having a self-
 supporting Athletic Association, many members of the University committee, 
 including a majority of the members of the committee, think that the Athletic 
 Association should no longer be a private corporation.210 
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The faculty’s concerns about the Athletic Association being a private entity were echoed 
by UGA historian, Thomas Dyer.  The faculty in the University Council recommended 
that the Board of Regents do everything in its power to move the Athletic Association 
back under the umbrella of the university’s governance structure.  Their argument for 
reverting back was that at the time only 6 or 7 other schools in the country had Athletic 
Associations that were separate entities.  The ad hoc committee also argued that the legal 
separation of the Athletic Association from the university implied that intercollegiate 
athletics is different from other university activities.  The committee also implied that 
since the Athletic Association was a private entity, it could operate in secret unlike the 
university which was required to have open records concerning all of its business.  The ad 
hoc committee also offered solutions or additional recommendations to these problems.   
 First, it felt that if the Athletic Association was to remain legally separate from 
the institution, it should at least open its records for view by the public due to the nature 
of its connection to the University of Georgia.  Second, they proposed that the number of 
faculty members serving on the Athletic Association board should increase and the 
number of alumni on the board should decrease.  Third, it recommended that the 
assignment of football tickets primarily based on donations to athletics be changed to 
account for giving to the university as a whole.  Fourth, the committee requested that the 
president, the athletic director, and the faculty chair for athletics work to lobby the 
NCAA to prohibit freshmen from participating in intercollegiate athletics.211  This is a 
similar argument made by college football scholars like John Sayle Watterson and John 
Thelin.  Last, the committee recommended that the use of Sanford Stadium, the football 
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stadium, be shared by more than just the Athletic Association.  At the time, the stadium 
was only used for football games and graduation.  To make their point, the committee 
argued, “it is questionable whether such a valuable institutional resource in the center of 
the campus should be inaccessible to the University Community some 358 days of the 
year.”212 
Today, the stadium still sits in the middle of campus and is only accessible for football 
games and graduation.  During graduation ceremonies held in the stadium, no one is 
allowed on the field. 
 Following the University Council’s modification and approval of the ad hoc 
committee’s recommendations, interim President Henry King Stanford responded to them.  
In general, Stanford supported the recommendations and made few changes.  However, 
Stanford did not take a firm stand in favor of many of the Council’s recommendations 
concerning athletics.  For example, one of the Council’s recommendations stated, 
“NCAA regulations shall play no part in the admissions process at the University of 
Georgia.”213  Stanford did not wholly support the recommendation, but instead stated that 
he “interpreted the spirit of this recommendation to be that all athletes shall meet the 
established admissions standards for regularly admitted students.”214  Stanford stated that 
he agreed with the spirit of the recommendation, but never committed to officially 
approving it.  Stanford argued that the admissions committee and the President have 
authority over admissions and he did not want to usurp that authority.  Stanford managed 
to stay neutral throughout the transition period.  However, being neutral meant he also 
did not lean towards supporting the athletic department more than the academic 
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departments.  Dr. Bruce Shutt, the University Registrar during this time period wrote in 
an article he published concerning the case that shortly after the trial, “a new Acting 
President, Dr. Henry King Stanford, was appointed.  From the day he took office, there 
were no successful appeals from the Athletic Department to the President regarding 
eligibility of athletes.”215  Stanford’s impact was felt because he did not take a hard line 
in either direction.  He instead allowed the faculty to become more engaged in the 
governance of the university and kept the athletic department’s influence from stopping 
the momentum gained from a change in regime.  Additionally, Stanford’s successor, 
Charles Knapp stated that “the faculty will have primary responsibility for decisions 
involving admissions, academic standards and promotion and tenure policy.  I will be 
involved, but the executive authority rests with the faculty.”216   
 Before the Jan Kemp trial, the faculty’s perspective was that they were kept out of 
the governance structure of the University.  The trial resulted in the resignation of 
President Davison and made athletic scandal a point of concern for the University.  In 
response to these issues, the faculty began to recommend changes through the University 
Council.  At the same time, an interim president, Dr. Henry King Stanford, focused on 
bringing a sense of calm and creating an environment that was more a true marketplace 
of ideas.  The Kemp trial opened the door for the University to hire a new president who 
was committed to including faculty in the governance structure and maintaining a 
collegial environment.  Knapp’s view of governance was, “we have to decide together 
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what our future is going to be. . . I don’t want anyone to say that important decisions 
were reached in secret.”217
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 At the first intercollegiate football game between Rutgers and Princeton in 1869, 
a Rutgers professor supposedly yelled at the participants, “You will come to no Christian 
end!”218  This challenge and outcry from faculty members is representative of the clash 
between academic supporters and athletic boosters that has become a permanent part of 
the university structure and culture.  For universities with revenue-producing football 
programs, this clash has seen students, faculty members, administrators, and alumni and 
alumnae get caught in a cross-fire.  The impact of the events surrounding the Jan Kemp 
trial on the people involved demonstrated this metaphor.  The University of Georgia 
became one in a list of many universities that fed their desire for increased revenue, 
athletic success, and public prestige.  Without concern for the impact it had on some of 
those involved, the clash between athletics and academics left a trail of resignations, 
psychological trauma, and illiterate athletes at the University of Georgia.  Studying the 
events surrounding the Jan Kemp trial provided a localized and personal look at how the 
increased commercialization of athletics and an unwillingness to exert presidential power 
and control over athletics led to the evolution of a system built on corruption and greed.  
Analysis of the impact of the Jan Kemp trial identified a clear set of circumstances that 
created an environment at the University of Georgia where the promulgation of college 
football superseded the academic mission.   
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 Analysis of the literature identified themes from the most renowned reform efforts 
in intercollegiate athletics, the Carnegie Report of 1929 and the Knight Commission of 
1989.  These reports identified presidential control, commercialization of athletics, and 
corruption of the student-athlete ideal through preferential treatment.219  The themes that 
emerged from the Carnegie Report of 1929 are points of concern in the decision making 
of administrators at University of Georgia.  Fifty years after the Carnegie Report, 
commercialization of athletics at the university and an unwillingness to challenge this 
goal led to a lack of appropriate presidential control by then president, Fred Davison.  
Therefore, the preferential treatment of athletes persisted despite the efforts of some 
faculty members and administrators to change the system.  The system uncovered during 
the Jan Kemp trial is similar to the events and activities described in the literature.  
Robert Hutchins’ decision to abolish football at the University of Chicago in the 1930s 
was the only significant instance where a university president chose academic standards 
over athletic prowess.  Unlike Hutchins, President Davison supported the use of college 
football as a means to increase institutional prestige and commercialization at the expense 
of academic integrity.  The focus on the commercialization of college football at the 
University of Georgia led to numerous instances of preferential treatment uncovered 
during the Jan Kemp trial.  The persistence of preferential treatment without any 
challenge from the president put faculty members and lower ranked administrators in the 
middle of a maelstrom of power and politics.   
Commercialization of College Football 
 As discussed earlier, the influence of Walter Camp led to college football 
becoming more entrepreneurial and business-like.  In the 1880s at Yale, Camp 
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recognized the revenue generating possibilities of college football and created a structure 
that took the control of athletics away from students and put it into the hands of alumni 
and administrators.  Other schools followed the example of Walter Camp and Yale as 
they created their football programs.  The formula for success was to start a football team, 
travel to play prestigious teams like Yale, Princeton, and Harvard in exchange for a large 
sum of money, and use the exposure from the football team to increase enrollment.  Like 
other institutions, the University of Georgia modeled its program after Camp’s program 
at Yale, even to the point of adopting the same mascot.  
The University of Georgia modeled its campus after Yale and even adopted the 
same mascot.  The University of Georgia also developed a commonality with Yale by 
using athletics to promote the institution and increase enrollment.  The creation of the 
University of Georgia Athletic Association as a private entity in 1929 coincided with the 
building of Sanford stadium and UGA’s first win over Yale.   
The establishment of the athletic association as a private entity allowed the football 
program to operate outside the umbrella of the university and focus on the development 
of the program and revenue generation without the control or input of the university.  
This structure eventually created an adversarial relationship and power struggle between 
athletics, the faculty, and top administrators at the university.  The desire to increase 
revenue and increase athletic prestige created a tremendous amount of pressure which led 
to the lowering of admissions standards and preferential treatment of athletes.  Tom Dyer, 
John Thelin, and Hue Henry all looked at the privatization of the athletic association at 
the University of Georgia as a major turning point that established the commercial 
importance of football to the University of Georgia.  Becoming a private entity allowed 
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the football program and its personnel to work outside the control and confines of the 
university.  The athletic association was then empowered to bring in as much revenue as 
possible to increase its chances of fielding a winning team.  The educational justification 
for this in 1929 was to expose the university to more prospective students and bring in 
prominent faculty members.  In the 1980s, there was no reason to justify the separation.  
It was just considered a part of the system.  The justification for increased profile of 
college football was simply to increase revenue.   
 Generating revenue was at the core of many of the decisions made where 
academic integrity was overlooked for the sake of athletic prowess.  In the faculty 
meeting that was secretly taped by Theresa Timmons, Leroy Ervin stated his view on the 
true relationship that athletes had with the university: 
 I know for a fact these kids would not be here if it were not for their utility to the 
 institution.  There is no real sound academic reason for their being here other than 
 to be utilized to produce income.220   
 
The NCAA lowered the entrance requirements for athletes and UGA adjusted its 
standards to meet the NCAA standards.  Some athletes came to the university and could 
not read or write.  If not for their athletic ability, they would not be attending the 
university.  There is historical evidence that supports this type of preferential treatment.  
In the book, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, 
Yale, and Princeton,  Jerome Karabel discusses the reasons for preferential admissions 
given by a past Dean of Admissions at Harvard, Wilbur Bender: 
 The decisions made by Wilbur Bender described athletic ability as more than a 
 tie-breaker; instead it was a decided plus factor.  According to Bender, to be sure, 
 Harvard would not admit a man, no matter how great a football player he may be, 
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 unless he is intellectually qualified and sound of character.  That said, the 
 underlying message strongly supported athletes and athletics;  Harvard, Bender 
 maintained, would be a poor place without football and had no intention of going 
 the way of Chicago.221 
 
When Bender speaks of Chicago, he is referring the University of Chicago’s decision to 
abolish football in the 1930s. 
 The pressure on the faculty to help athletes maintain eligibility led to faculty 
members creating additional interventions because many of the athletes were at an 
academic level that made it seem impossible for them to ever graduate.  In the same 
meeting taped by Timmons, one faculty member tried to explain that the athletes being 
admitted were at such a low academic level that they might never graduate.  However, 
the expectation of Virginia Trotter, the Vice-President for Academic Affairs, was that 
once admitted, the university and specifically the Developmental Studies program had an 
obligation to help the athletes.  In a faculty meeting, Trotter said, 
 Once we admit them, I feel we have some responsibility towards them even 
 though, I mean, if they’re making progress.  And if uh, if they are, and even if 
 they’re not going to graduate, and I think we are really talking through our hats if 
 we think these students are going to graduate, but they could be a lot better off as 
 a citizen, having been through our program.222 
 
The faculty members in Developmental Studies were told by their supervisor and the 
chief academic officer that these athletes were never really expected to graduate, but were 
going to be there nonetheless.  Later in the meeting, Trotter made it clear by saying, “As 
long as they meet the NCAA standards, we’re going to take them.  I mean, that is just a 
                                                 
221
 Jerome Karabel, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and 
 Princeton, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005). P. 186.  
222
 Teresa Timmons, audiotape recording of faculty meeting in the Developmental Studies Program, Fall 
 1983. 
108 
 
fact of life.”223  At this point, it is clear that the chief administrators responsible for the 
academic mission of the University of Georgia determined that for the sake of revenue 
producing athletics, they allowed the NCAA to determine the standards for their 
institution.  With the decision made by Trotter, the faculty members had very little 
options other than to conform, leave, or find a way to challenge the system. 
In the media and during testimony, President Davison repeatedly defended the 
University of Georgia’s reasons for admitting athletes below the set standards.  He also 
repeatedly stated that if any special treatment was given, that he did not know about it.  In 
contrast, Dr. Trotter stated in interviews with Board of Regents auditors that President 
Davison made it clear to her directly or indirectly that they should support admitting 
athletes below the established standards.  Trotter recounted a conversation she had with 
President Davison where the president stated that “if we’re going to compete we have to, 
you know, go with the NCAA standards, and, that we have to find a way to, you know, 
we need to find a way to deal with this.”224   Leroy Ervin also stated that he felt he didn’t 
have a choice.  When interviewed by the Board of Regents during its audit of 
Developmental Studies after the trial, Leroy Ervin reiterated a statement he had made 
during the trial, “it is nothing new to say that these kids were only at the University- only 
for their ability to win games and produce income- I’ll say that over and over and over 
again.”225  The pressure from the athletic department coupled with the president’s 
unwillingness to challenge the football program led to the continuation of athletes 
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receiving preferential treatment.  Trotter and Ervin believed that the president was in full 
support of preferential treatment and that regardless of the policies, the athletic programs 
needed to keep whatever players necessary to maintain a winning edge.  The plight of 
these administrators demonstrated the importance of the president in decisions involving 
big-time college athletics as presented by the Carnegie Report and the Knight 
Commission. 
The concern that losing on the field might lead to a loss of revenue created a corrupt 
system of inadequate checks and balances.  The Developmental Studies program was 
isolated from the rest of the academic community on campus.  The large influx of 
influence and money the athletic association funneled into the Developmental Studies 
program meant that decisions made in the program at times were based on the needs of 
the athletic program.  Nor did academic administrators sustain the academic mission of 
the University.    
Presidential Control 
 The two major reform efforts studied in this dissertation identified the president as 
the key catalyst for change and for upholding the academic integrity of the institution.  
These reform efforts have recognized that the presidents have tried to take a step back 
and allow the athletics programs to develop their systems and policies outside the 
university’s umbrella of control.  The Carnegie Report of 1929 made the following 
statement, 
 “many university or college presidents have left the shaping of athletic policies to 
 conferences, committees, or specialists in physical education, who represent not 
 so much the welfare of the institution and its undergraduates as special interests of 
 one sort or another, all of which apparently feel that material prosperity, their own 
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 prestige, or professional standing must be served before other ends can be 
 considered.”226  
 
According to the reform efforts, the president of the university has to take control of 
athletics in the same way they should take control of the academic and fiscal operations 
of the institution.  The Knight Commission report in 1991 argued, 
Presidents are accountable for the major elements in the university’s life. The 
burden of leadership falls on them for the conduct of the institution, whether in 
the classroom or on the playing field.  The president cannot be a figurehead 
whose leadership applies elsewhere in the university but not in the athletics 
department.227 
 
These two major reform efforts established the argument that the president of the 
university must be actively involved in keeping the academic mission the main priority 
for the university.  The president must do this in spite of the pressure that comes from 
being involved in revenue producing athletics like football or the public and media 
pressure that puts athletic prestige ahead of academic integrity.   
 The Jan Kemp trial challenged the role of President Davison and gave insights 
into the pressure faced by presidents at universities with revenue-producing football 
programs.  Additionally, the trial showed how these pressures affected the way Davison 
saw the role of college football at the university.  
 Previous reform efforts, including the Knight Commission’s current efforts, 
involve presidential control as a key component to maintaining a balance and protecting 
academic integrity.  However, this focus puts an extremely dangerous burden on any one 
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person who is willing to challenge and look beyond the tremendous external pressure 
provided by revenue producing sports like football.  Under these recommendations for 
reform, the University of Georgia under Fred Davision’s leadership did little to change 
the system and preferential treatment of athletes continued to persist at the institution.  
President Davison was extremely involved in college football at the national and local 
level.  However, while he touted standards and reform within the national policy making 
circles, the policies and practice at his own institution were antithetical to these reform 
efforts.   
Admitting athletes into Developmental Studies who functioned academically at a 
level below the average at the University of Georgia and additionally feeling the pressure 
to exit these students or extend their time in Developmental Studies created a situation 
where other forms of preferential treatment occurred.  President Davison said he knew 
nothing about athletes being exited without the proper grades.  During the trial, Davison 
pointed to his involvement in the development of Proposition 48 as proof that the 
university was focused on increasing the standards.    
President Davison wanted to see the NCAA raise the academic standards for 
athletes, but he did not want UGA to lead that charge.  He only wanted to raise the 
university’s standards if competing universities raised their standards.  When faced with 
the intersection of giving athletes preferential treatment or not, UGA’s reason was clear.  
Athletes have a monetary value to the institution.  They are a product that brings money 
and that is worth lowering the GPA requirement 1 point or more and foregoing the use of 
the SAT.  The commercialization of football played a tremendous role in the admission 
of athletes at UGA.  This pressure, supported by the president, created the difficult 
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decisions that administrators like Leroy Ervin and Virginia Trotter had to make.  
According to the organizational structure, Ervin had the ultimate decision making power 
for Developmental Studies admissions, but he never felt that way.  In an interview during 
the Board of Regents audit of Developmental Studies programs in the state of Georgia, 
Ervin described one instance where he felt he had no choice in admitting an athlete.     
There was one woman that we had no choice- well, she was an athlete, but she 
was a non-revenue producing athlete.  But the point is, is that she was going to be 
taken- that was made clear.  She was a [relative] of one of the most prominent 
athletes.228 
 
In a joint interview with Dr. Trotter, Ervin described how he received pressure from the 
athletic department. 
[Dick] Copas would say, Well, you know Vince [Dooley] is gonna get his way, so, 
you know, I . . . he’s gonna send me to Dr. Trotter, and if Dr. Trotter says no, then 
he’s going to go to the President, and he’s gonna get what he wants from the 
President.229 
 
During the interviews, Ervin felt that he was caught in the middle.  He was expected to 
deliver the message to faculty members on admissions exceptions and exiting overrides.  
Even if he disagreed, he felt there wasn’t an option without directly defying the President, 
Vice-President for Academic Affairs, and the Athletic Director. 
 Davison’s real views on college football at the University of Georgia may never 
be known, but Virginia Trotter recalled an exchange when she was interviewed during an 
audit of Developmental Studies programs throughout the state of Georgia following the 
Kemp trial.  She said that he never pressured her to exit students or give preferential 
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treatment to athletes, but he would make statements to her like, “if we couldn’t exit the 
students, then we could just play high school football.”230  
 During an interview, Hue Henry shared his view on the current state of 
intercollegiate athletics at the University of Georgia.  Henry’s response was,  
I think it’s a mess.  I think we addressed flat out corruption in the Kemp trial.  I 
 don’t think we addressed it and it wasn’t appropriate for us.  The systemic 
 problems have never been addressed.  I was really disappointed to see the 
 standing of athletes today.  In fact, in today’s paper the graduation rates are falling.  
 I mean, did we forget.  [laughs]  Apparently so, I mean that’s been a long time.  It 
 will be 20 years this past year.231   
 
Today’s college athletics programs still evidence Howard Pritchett’s list of evils.  
Many coaches today make more money then the president of the university.  Revenues at 
big-time college athletic programs are at an all-time high.  Athletes in football, basketball, 
and other sports to some extent have separate dining halls and fly charter planes to 
participate in their sport.  Instances of drug use, violence, and academic misconduct put 
universities in the news on a regular basis in relation to their football program.  Watterson 
claimed that “the interplay of costs and revenues drove big-time gridiron powers to go all 
out to create powerful and profitable teams.”232  The desire to create a profitable team is 
exactly what led the University of Georgia to support athletic initiatives regardless of 
how they affected the institutions academic perception and policies.   
During the trial, Davison acted as if he had no knowledge of the decisions being 
made by his chief administrators.  Trotter and Ervin both vehemently contended that 
Davison knew about the decisions to exit athletes and other forms of academic corruption.  
Davison tried to cover this issue by continuing to argue about his involvement with the 
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NCAA in crafting Proposition 48, which was another attempt at reform.  However, it is 
difficult to believe that Davison was not aware of and involved in decisions about athletes 
as he claimed during the trial.  Davison had a history of micromanaging the faculty and 
staff at the university.  Hue Henry told of stories where Davison directly involved himself 
in decisions to close down lab experiments and to personally ban Henry from speaking on 
campus.  In his early years as president, he did not allow students to protest the war in 
Vietnam.  Additionally, Davison continuously spoke of how he was leading the charge in 
athletic reform and that once they made changes nationally, the university would change.  
Despite all of the rhetoric surrounding Davison’s real involvement in academic 
corruption at the University of Georgia, it is Davison’s inaction when it came to the 
issues in the Jan Kemp trial that offer insight into the greatest concern for future reform 
efforts.   
Like presidents before him at UGA and other universities, Davison never looked 
to his own campus as a catalyst and canvas for reforming college football.  He used the 
argument that other schools do it, so UGA is just like them.  Davison never considered 
putting the academic mission ahead of all other needs.  He concerned himself with the 
utilitarian benefit that athletes brought to the university.  Instead, he blamed high schools 
for not preparing the athletes for college.  He asked Trotter to find ways to keep athletes 
eligible or the university may be forced to play high school football.  With this lack of 
support from the president, any meaningful attempt at reform at the University of Georgia 
most likely would be in vain.   
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Recommendations for Future Research 
 
One area to consider for future research is to compare the state of athletics at the 
University of Georgia between 1986 and now.  As is likely with any crisis, some 
immediate changes occurred within the faculty senate and in some procedures.  However, 
an important question is: what long term effect, if any, has the athletic department and the 
university seen in relation to the trial.  The issues seen at the University of Georgia are 
not isolated events.  Every year, universities around the United States face scandals 
related to the interplay of athletics and academics.  The reality is that college football is 
big business.   
Murray Sperber argued this point in his book Beer and Circus.  Sperber compared 
college athletics to a business.  Sperber argued that universities are running athletic 
departments like a business and thus lacking any regard for the academic well-being of 
athletes.233  With the amount of money involved in revenue-producing athletics, any 
substantive challenge to the current athletic structure must address the revenue issue.  
Therefore, the main reason reform efforts have failed and will continue to fail is that the 
majority of universities and the presidents leading them will not make major changes if 
they believe changes will impact revenue in a negative way.  So despite all the corruption, 
preferential treatment, publicity, and more, money is the driving force that allows athletic 
departments and football programs to maintain their power and connection.  This offers 
another question for future research: Can efforts to reform college football make a 
difference on a very small and local level if they have a certain level of notoriety and 
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people willing to sacrifice themselves physically and mentally for challenging the athletic 
association?   
The stress and pressure that Jan Kemp endured is something to be studied closer.  
Hue Henry felt that Kemp went through a whistleblower syndrome.  While there have 
been studies of whistleblowers in corporations, one way to understand the psychological 
and physical impact of corruption is to look at whistleblowers in college athletics.  Kemp 
tried to kill herself as a result of the trial, faced continued stress from the decisions made 
in Developmental Studies, and faced a ruined marriage as a result of her experience.  If 
Kemp’s experience is an indicator of what a person must go through to challenge a 
system as powerful as college football, it is not surprising that few people choose to fight 
as long and as hard as Kemp.   
The other psychological impact to consider is that of the athlete and the impact 
race has on the decisions of administrators as well.  Throughout this analysis, many of the 
discussions surrounding these athletes focused on students who were illiterate, 
unmotivated academically, and who more than likely never graduated.  A majority of 
these athletes were African-American.  What is the impact of the system on these athletes?  
In the case of the University of Georgia, the data showed that these athletes were 
considered of a utilitarian benefit to the institution.  Leroy Ervin is African-American and 
was in a position to challenge the system, but felt he had no choice due to the power and 
influence of athletics and the lack of support he received from the President.  Ervin 
highlighted the racial component in the meeting secretly taped by Teresa Timmons: 
We try to teach them there but there is no way to do it.  The majority of these kids 
 are black that are coming in, and it kind of rips at me at the insides and I take it 
 very, very, personal.  I know for a fact that these kids would not be here if it were 
 not for their utility to the institution.  They are used as a kind of raw material in 
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 the production of some goods to be sold as whatever product, and they get 
 nothing in return.234 
 
They are the major producers of the revenue, but they receive the least amount of 
resources and support from the institution.  Another study could take a closer look at how 
athletes respond to the system.  What happens to them after football?  Do they become 
postal workers instead of garbage men as Hale Almand suggested during his opening 
statement?   
The Challenges of Athletics Reform 
 
Considering what Kemp went through during her experience at the University of 
Georgia, it is disheartening to consider that her efforts were in vain.  However, 
graduation rates for football players at the University of Georgia are still around 48%.235 
The athletic association is still a private entity that controls the program outside the 
umbrella of the institution.  The university has faced violations and scandals in basketball 
as recently as 2003.  Unfortunately, it appears that the Kemp trial did not have the effect 
of completely reforming college athletics.   
It is hard to imagine a scenario where universities would risk losing fans and thus 
revenue in exchange for focusing on academic prowess.  Even in the situation at the 
University of Chicago where the president abolished football, he was only successful 
doing so when the team was losing and the program was not as financially beneficial.  
Thelin suggested that reform efforts ought to focus on controlling participation of athletes 
so they cannot play during their freshman year.236  Watterson thinks that the faculty 
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should be more involved in the control of athletics.237  Sperber argues that college 
athletics should be made professional and be only affiliated with universities in name. 238 
The athletes would not be students and the athletic association would receive no benefits 
of being a part of the university.  In the current scenario, reform efforts continue to offer 
adjustments to the core issues in college football.  However, the two main themes 
presented in every major reform effort remain at the core, commercialization and 
presidential control.   
Reform isn’t where universities and the NCAA should focus energy.  Instead, the 
focus needs to be on slowly coming to terms with the realization that football will remain 
a powerful influence at universities as long as generating revenue is important to 
universities.  In a capitalist economy, the generation of revenue may never become a 
secondary concern for institutions.  Therefore, institutions are left with modifying the 
system towards a goal that satisfies the supporters of unwavering academic integrity and 
athletic boosters.  The experience of the actual athletes during and beyond college needs 
to be the focus of research and reform in college football.  Utilizing data on the quality of 
life of the majority of athletes, not just the privileged few who go on to play 
professionally, can provide needed information to make better decisions concerning 
athletic programs and the students who participate in them.   
A final observation concerns another possible avenue of reform.  As it stands now, 
the crux of the issue comes down to justifying the lowering of academic standards to 
accommodate athletes.  In reality, many of these athletes would never be able to attend 
the universities where they play football without an athletic scholarship.  However, if 
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these universities began forming partnerships with community and technical colleges to 
allow athletes the option to major in an associate degree level technical program there 
would not be the issue of the athlete being unable to meet the academic standards.  For 
example, the University of Georgia and Athens Technical College are both in the same 
town.  If the two institutions merged, athletes could major in associate degree programs 
like welding and graphic design.  They would be able to take classes at an academic level 
they are prepared for at the time they start college.  In the event they are unable to 
continue playing football after two or three years, they would more than likely have 
completed a program that affords them the knowledge of a trade that allows them to 
attain employment after college.  Additionally, if they do grow academically, they could 
continue in a bachelor’s degree program at the university.  Since most technical and 
community colleges have open admissions, this would eliminate the need to lower 
standards and fill spots in the university with athletes.  These spots could be filled by 
students with the academic credentials to go directly into bachelor’s degree level work.  
Unfortunately, college football has evolved to a point where no matter how genuine a 
reform effort may be, it has little chance of changing the current system.  Instead, 
institutions continue to tweak and modify the current structure without making significant 
changes.   
The Jan Kemp trial offers an in-depth look into the negative impact revenue 
producing athletics had on one university and a large number of the people involved.  
Kemp’s story is important because it offers a glimpse into the issues that future 
administrators must consider as they work with revenue-producing athletics like college 
football.  In 2008, Georgia State University officially started a football program.  The 
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university will spend 7 million dollars to start the program.  Carl Patton, president of 
Georgia State University, spoke about why football was started at Georgia State.  “I’d 
talk to students and they all said we want a real university and when they said real, they 
meant football.”239  Patton’s view of football at Georgia State is indicative of the 
perception that Doug Toma argued in Football U.240  As Georgia State develops its 
football program, the chief administrators and primarily the president must make difficult 
decisions early on about what influence football will have on decisions concerning the 
academic mission.  Heeding the warning signs that evolved from the Jan Kemp trial may 
help them avoid the same pitfalls as they face the real challenge of balancing football 
with academic integrity. 
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The Effects of the Jan Kemp Affair on the University of Georgia 
Interview Questions 
These questions serve as a guide for each interview.  In some cases, additional 
questions may be asked or questions may be deleted depending on the direction of the 
interview and/or the perspective the participant may bring to the research. 
Personal Information 
1. Could you please give me some basic background information about yourself—
your full name, date and place of birth, education, career portfolio, your current 
occupation? 
2. During what time frame were you employed at the University of Georgia? 
3. Tell me about your role(s) at the University of Georgia while you were employed 
there. 
View of Intercollegiate Athletics and College Football 
4. Describe to me your general views on intercollegiate athletics and specifically 
college football. 
5. Tell me your thoughts and feelings when I say the term, student-athlete. 
6. Describe for me your thoughts on the past and current attempts to reform 
intercollegiate athletics. 
7. Some people might say that college football has an extremely large amount of 
power and influence on college campuses.  What do you say in response to that 
statement? 
Perceptions of College Football at the University of Georgia 
8. Share with me your perception of college football at the University of Georgia. 
9. Describe your perception of college football players at the University of Georgia 
10. At the University of Georgia, how does college football relate to the rest of the 
institution? 
11. At what level, if any, do you participate in college football experience at the 
University of Georgia? 
12. How does the general student body react to college football at the University of 
Georgia? 
Perception of the Campus Environment and the Jan Kemp Affair 
13. Describe the campus environment before the Jan Kemp case.  How did it change 
during the trial?  Please share your thoughts on how the environment has changed, 
if any, since then. 
14. Describe your memories of the Jan Kemp affair at the University of Georgia. 
What was it like?  How were you involved in the situation? How did you respond 
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when you learned of the case? What did it make you think about the University 
and college footballl?  
15. How did the Jan Kemp affair affect student-athletes? General student body? 
Faculty? Staff? Alumni? 
16. Tell me your thoughts on the following key figures/departments in relation to the 
Jan Kemp Affair. 
 Jan Kemp 
 Virginia Trotter 
 Leroy Ervin 
 Fred Davison 
 Vince Dooley 
 Hue Henry/Pat Nelson- attorneys for Jan Kemp 
 Hale Almand- attorney for the University 
 Developmental Studies 
 Athletics Department 
 Faculty 
 NCAA 
Conclusion 
17.  What factors and influences created the Jan Kemp trial? Why? 
18.  How did the Jan Kemp trial affect the University and athletics in the years 
 following the settlement? 
 
19.  What consequences if any, has the University faced for being involved in 
 improprieties? 
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Georgia State University 
Department of Educational Policy Studies 
Informed Consent  
Title:    The Jan Kemp Affair at the University of Georgia:  A Challenge 
that Led to Reform 
 
Principal Investigator:  Dr. Philo Hutcheson, P.I. 
    Michael Fulford, Student P.I. 
 
I. Purpose:   
The purpose of the study is to investigate the effects of the Jan Kemp affair on the 
University of Georgia.  You have been asked to participate in this study because 
of your unique knowledge of the case and its effects on the University of Georgia.  
Participation will require a minimum of 1 hour of your time and based on your 
responses may take up to a maximum 3 hours .  In addition, you may be asked 
some questions beyond the interview time in order to clarify answers. 
 
 
II. Procedures:  
 
If you decide to participate, you will meet with Michael Fulford and answer 
questions related to the Jan Kemp affair and its effects on the University of 
Georgia.  The following is a synopsis of your involvement in this study: 
 
1. We will meet at a location of your choice. 
2. The duration of the interview will be a minimum of 1 hour but may 
go longer to a maximum of 3 hours dependent on your 
involvement and the answers you give. 
3. You will be interviewed only by Michael Fulford 
4. The interview will involve you and Michael Fulford only. 
5. The interview will be recorded for analysis purposes and to ensure 
accurate communication of your answers in the study. 
6. At any point in time, you may end the interview simply by saying, 
“I need to stop here.” 
7. The interview will consist of open ended questions related to the 
Jan Kemp and its effects on the University of Georgia. 
 
III. Risks:  
 
  
In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal 
day of life.  
   
 
IV. Benefits:  
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Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we have to gain 
information about the effects on the Jan Kemp case on the University of Georgia to 
better understand how intercollegiate athletics effects educational institutions and 
to understand reform efforts.  
 
V. Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:  
 
Participation in this research is voluntary.  You have the right to not be in this 
study.  If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the 
right to drop out at any time.  You may skip questions or stop participating at 
any time.  Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled. 
 
VI. Confidentiality:  
 
Due to the nature of this study, the information you provide in your interview will 
be used in the analysis.  Since your perspective is specific and vital to the success 
of the study, your name will be attached to your answers whenever they are used 
in the study in order to give you proper credit for the answer and for purposes of 
validity.  If there is any information you disclose which you want to be kept 
confidential, identify that information and the researcher will not use that 
information in the study. 
 
VII.    Contact Persons:  
 
Contact Michael Fulford at 678-376-5441 or michael_fulford@talkamerica.net or Dr. 
Philo Hutcheson at phutches@gsu.edu if you have questions about this study.  If you 
have questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research study, 
you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at 404-413-
3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu. 
 
VIII. Copy of Consent Form to Subject:  
 
We will give you a copy of this consent form to keep. 
If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please sign below. 
  
 ____________________________________________  _________________        
Participant        Date  
           
     _____________________________________________  _________________               
Principal Investigator or Researcher Obtaining Consent   Date 
